Chapter 8. Foreign Relations

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, minister of foreign affairs, 1974–92

GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY faces formidable challenges and difficult decisions. For forty years, Germany was divided between East and West, its border the focus of a nuclear standoff. On October 3, 1990, the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany), were united under one democratic government. As Germany begins to search for a new voice abroad, some circles fear that the country might once again come to dominate the continent.

After unification, the country was beset by difficult domestic problems. Integration of Germany's five new eastern states (*Länder*; sing., *Land*) proved more costly and time consuming than experts had originally estimated. In addition, there was persistent friction between the former West Germans (*Wessis* in colloquial German) and the former East Germans (*Ossis*). This friction often centered on the costs and burdens of unification. A spate of right-wing radicalism and violence also erupted throughout Germany, primarily directed against foreign workers and refugees. Between 1990 and mid-1995, Germany had taken in more asylum-seekers than all other European Union (EU—see Glossary) members combined, a fact that angered some Germans because of the expense this humanitarian action entailed. Finally, there was a debate on the competitiveness of the German economy. West German workers had come to enjoy some of the highest wages and most extensive benefits among workers anywhere in the industrialized world. As a result of high labor costs, however, companies had begun to downsize, and many were relocating production facilities abroad. Unemployment was increasing throughout Germany.

In this context of domestic preoccupation, Germany began to confront disorienting external circumstances as well. The European Community (EC—see Glossary) had embarked on a process of profound change as it considered its course toward political and economic union. In December 1991, the EC's twelve members signed the Treaty on European Union (commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty—see Glossary), creating the EU, a blueprint for unifying the continent. The United States, previously West Germany's most important ally, began to rethink its own European role as it adapted to the new post-Cold War environment and its own domestic challenges.

Russia and the other states of the former Soviet bloc entered into an uncertain relationship of dependence on Germany, the country that led the international aid effort for the emerging democracies of the new Europe.

Meanwhile, Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, the humanitarian mission of the United Nations (UN) in Somalia, and war in the former Yugoslavia created significant challenges for German foreign policy. Germany's policy makers were confronted with the question of whether or not their country's participation in multilateral actions sanctioned by the UN would be restricted to nonmilitary or peacekeeping roles. Would Germany be able to overcome internal legal obstacles and psychological inhibitions stemming from its turbulent twentieth-century history of militarism to participate in peace-enforcing combat missions?

Despite initial reluctance and arduous debate, Germany's foreign policy planners began to accept a new role with regard to Germany's military, and incremental steps were taken to normalize the use of the country's armed forces. The German navy patrolled the eastern Mediterranean off the coasts of Egypt and Syria during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. From May 1991 to October 1993, German military personnel served with UN forces in Cambodia. In March 1994, German troops joined the UN's operation in Somalia. German Alpha Jets were deployed in eastern Turkey to help enforce the UN's Kurdish safe zone in northern Iraq. And German pilots flew North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary) missions over Bosnia as part of the UN's "Deny Flight" operation. By the mid-1990s, the chief legal obstacles to the deployment of German armed forces abroad had been overcome, but the "normalization" of German foreign policy, it had become clear, would still take some time.

Once unified, Germany struggled to think clearly about its national priorities. For Germans, unification meant new borders, new resources, and a return to the center of the continent, or *Mittellage*. It also meant new responsibilities and new expectations. Historically, Germany had often been either too strong or too weak to be accepted by its neighbors.

Germany's return to the center of Europe entailed for the country's foreign policy establishment the beginnings of a subtle recalculation of the country's national interests and a gradual reexamination of its relationship to a number of international bodies. Those bodies included NATO, the EU,

the Western European Union (WEU—see Glossary); the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—see Glossary)—which was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE—see Glossary) in January 1995—and the UN. In the early post-Cold War years, Germany had assumed a leading role in advocating the expansion of NATO and the EU to include emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

Although German foreign policy remains deeply influenced by patterns of behavior developed during the Cold War, unified Germany's major foreign policies and goals are evolving. During the unification process, Germany had reaffirmed its pledge not to acquire weapons of mass destruction. But postunification Germany also made clear its interest in obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Foreign observers and Germans alike had begun the search for answers to emerging questions. What will it mean for Germany to be a "sovereign nation" again? Will German attempts of the past four decades to develop a postnational, European identity begin to fade, or will they be reinforced in this postunification era? What role will Germany play in Europe as well as globally? Will Germany dominate Europe again, and, if so, in what way? How will the new Germany, still carrying burdens from the past, define its national interest in the future?

Major Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies

Early Developments

Imperial Germany's foreign policy, from Otto von Bismarck's founding of the empire in 1871 until the empire's collapse at the end of World War I, was influenced by the country's exposed geographical situation, Germany's *Mittellage*, as well as by domestic difficulties. Looking abroad, German policy makers were often obsessed with the threat of encirclement (*Einkreisung*) by hostile neighbor states. Thus, after 1871 German foreign policy objectives centered on two principal tasks: to keep France, Germany's historical rival and enemy, isolated; and to balance the other major powers of the day in order to ensure that no single power would be able to exert pressure or militarily confront the newly united German state.

"Modern Germany was born encircled," writes David P. Calleo, a noted foreign affairs specialist. Indeed, German leaders of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were often

concerned with their country's vulnerability. They were preoccupied with national frontiers and responded to this preoccupation with a heavy emphasis on military power. Yet the international policy, or *Weltpolitik*, of Bismarck (1862–90) and Kaiser Wilhelm II (r. 1888–1918) differed little from that of other major European powers of the day, such as Britain or France. But Germany would come to fight and lose two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century. And the disastrous consequences of German militarism and the barbaric actions of Nazi Germany, in particular, had a profound impact on the development of West Germany's foreign policy between 1949 and 1989.

At first glance, the situation facing united Germany in the 1990s resembles the situation faced by imperial Germany, insofar as Germany has reclaimed a *Mittellage* and has returned geographically to the heart of the continent (surrounded by nine immediate neighbors). Yet the parallel ends there. Peaceful relations exist between Germany and bordering states. Like Germany, the country's neighbors are democratic. Relations between Germany and these neighbors are characterized not by confrontation but by economic cooperation and interdependence. In the first years following unification, there was no dispute about continued German membership in NATO. And Germany remains a faithful member of the EU—even as German policy makers have begun to reexamine their country's foreign policy and to search for a new hierarchy of German interests in Europe.

Postwar Developments

In the postwar period, the Federal Republic became known as "an economic giant" and a "political dwarf." During the Cold War, German foreign policy had been formulated under extraordinary circumstances. After World War II, the country was divided, and its sovereignty was limited. As a member of the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), communist East Germany's foreign policy was closely aligned with that of the Soviet Union. West Germany's foreign policy became characterized by a penchant for political and economic power over military power, by its preference for multilateralism over the exercise of unilateral actions, and by its concentration on European rather than global policy issues.

The characteristics of West Germany as a civilian European power wedded to multilateral structures stood in stark contrast

to German colonialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the military expansion pursued by Germany under Adolf Hitler's National Socialist rule from 1933 to 1945. In fact, the patterns of West Germany's foreign policy were very much a direct consequence of military defeat and occupation by the Allied Powers at the end of World War II. In reaction to the excesses of the past, the Federal Republic's foreign policy establishment developed a clear and strong aversion to power politics and remained reluctant to draw on populist, national sentiment in support of foreign policy goals.

Emblematic of West Germany's foreign policy was Bonn's Ostpolitik—the opening to the east that became a continuous, albeit varied, thread in the policies practiced by both center-left and center-right governments in Bonn over the two decades preceding the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Ostpolitik began in 1969, when Germany's coalition formed by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei—FDP) first took office. Ostpolitik was the result of a concept known as *Wandel durch Annäherung*, or change through rapprochement, created by Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–74) and his close adviser, Egon Bahr.

Ostpolitik was Bonn's policy of détente toward communist Europe. It rested on two assumptions: that the Federal Republic, despite the crimes subsequently committed by communist regimes, had a special responsibility to compensate Eastern Europe for the aggression and atrocities carried out by Nazi Germany; and that a web of treaties and agreements with the Soviet bloc would improve human rights for the citizens of these neighboring communist states, while creating a peace-inducing dialogue with communist regimes. Consequently, Ostpolitik consisted of three components: West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union, its ties to East Germany, and its dealings with the rest of Eastern Europe. In the case of East Germany, Ostpolitik represented Bonn's attempt through dialogue and cooperation with communist rulers to help overcome some of the burdens of Germany's division.

Unification

On November 28, 1989, three weeks after the breach of the Berlin Wall, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982–) presented to the Bundestag (the lower house of West Germany's parliament) his Ten-Point Plan outlining his proposal for the incremental cre-

ation of a confederation between the two German states. Kohl believed at the time—an overly optimistic assessment as history would soon show—that the process of internal economic unification could be achieved in three to four years.

There was much talk at the time that in presenting his Ten-Point Plan Chancellor Kohl was engaging in an overly assertive style of diplomacy because he had failed to adequately consult his partners within the governing coalition as well as the Western Allies. A number of leading members of the opposition SPD, moreover, rejected the idea of unification, viewing moves toward unity as a threat to the postwar order of peace and stability in Europe. The initial push by the Kohl government toward unification was driven by a number of considerations.

Kohl feared that if Bonn were not able to immediately set the terms and course of international discussion about events in East Germany, other European countries, particularly the Soviet Union and France, might seek a new variation on the most recent solution of the "German Question," namely, arranging for the containment of Germany within Europe's international order by dividing it into two. French president François Mitterrand's announcement of his intention to visit East Berlin just days prior to Kohl's Bundestag speech, for instance, fueled fears in Bonn that anxious neighbors might attempt to stabilize East Germany's fragile communist regime and its hemorrhaging economy.

There were domestic considerations for West Germany's chancellor as well. Kohl worried that if his party, the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union—CDU), did not seize the issue of unification and articulate a bold plan of action, political opponents might step in to fill the vacuum. Kohl's rivals included the SPD, but also the FDP, the junior partner in Kohl's coalition government, in power since late 1982. West Germany's federal president, Richard von Weizsäcker (1984–94), a member of Kohl's party, feared that the right-wing radical Republikaner (Die Republikaner) could make the issue their own in the upcoming national election campaign if the CDU did not preempt it.

It also had become clear within weeks of Kohl's proposed Ten-Point Plan that governing elites would be forced to respond to overwhelming pressure from the streets of East German cities and towns. The ways in which Kohl later defended the terms and timing of economic and monetary union with

East Germany illustrate this fact. He often reminded his critics that if Bonn were not prepared to bring the deutsche mark to East Germany, the East Germans would surely come to the deutsche mark, an allusion to the growing tide of East-West migration during the first six months of 1990.

Chancellor Kohl's Ten-Point Plan sought to intensify rapprochement with East Germany. The ten points consisted of calling for immediate measures to provide aid; cooperation with the GDR on an economic and cultural level; fundamental political and economic change in the GDR; a close-knit network of agreements; confederative structures, with the goal of forming a federation in Germany; a future structure of Germany that would fit into the future architecture of Europe as a whole; the power of attraction of the EC to remain a constant feature; the continuation of the CSCE process as a crucial part of the total European architecture, but with the possibility of new institutional forms; disarmament and arms control to keep step with political developments; and freedom within Europe to be maintained in such a way that the German people could, via self-determination, restore their unity. The reattainment of German state unity by peaceful means remained the political goal of the federal government.

In fact, East Germany disintegrated at an astonishing pace, and German foreign policy from late 1989 throughout 1990 was driven by concerns directly related to the unification process. In February 1990, East Germany's communist party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands—SED), transformed itself into the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus—PDS). East Germany's new prime minister, Hans Modrow, insisted that the reformed PDS would be able to find a "third way" between capitalism and socialism, permitting the GDR another life as a separate independent German state. Democratization and elections in May 1990 would legitimate the PDS's leading role in this process, Modrow believed, and would provide a new basis for relations between East Germany and West Germany.

The plans of East German reform communists were derailed in a matter of months, however. Discredited SED officials were publicly harassed and in some cases arrested for abuse of power and privilege. The leading role of the communist party was revoked from the GDR's constitution, and offices of the State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst, commonly

referred to as Stasi), the despised secret police, were occupied by citizens groups at sites throughout the country. Of the SED's 2.3 million members, nearly 1.6 million had deserted by early 1990.

By the end of January 1990, a deteriorating economy, sustained demonstrations throughout the country, and the daily exit of some 2,000 East German citizens for West Germany compelled opposition leaders who made up the Round Table, an interim "government," to convince Modrow to advance the date of East German elections from May 6 to March 18. By late spring, most observers agreed that the elections would no longer be a referendum on communist rule (opinion polls suggested that the communists would be defeated in fair, free elections), but rather on the terms and timing of German unification.

Confronted by this reality, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, having previously insisted that Moscow would not accept abolition of the East German state, retreated from this hard-line position. Although Gorbachev had renounced the Soviet Union's right to determine the national policies of Warsaw Pact members during the years and months prior to the breach of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet leadership had remained steadfastly committed to the overall status quo in Europe and to Germany's division into two states.

As the Berlin Wall collapsed and Kohl announced his Ten-Point Plan, the Soviet leadership delivered a number of statements and gestures that made it clear that Moscow had no intention of relinquishing its East German ally. Reasserting occupation rights, the Soviet Union called for a meeting of the ambassadors of the World War II Allies, which took place on December 11 at the Allied Control Council building in Berlin. A stream of Kremlin advisers insisted in interviews that unification was neither desirable nor feasible.

Nevertheless, on January 30 Prime Minister Modrow flew to Moscow for a meeting with Gorbachev, after which Gorbachev consented in principle to Germany's self-determination. When Modrow returned to East Berlin, he announced his own plan for inner-German rapprochement, a "Declaration on the Way to German Unity." The plan envisaged a confederation between the two German states, leading eventually to an all-German federation. According to the plan, both Bonn and East Berlin would gradually distance themselves from their respective alliance commitments.

In a speech delivered in West Berlin on December 12, United States secretary of state James Baker, echoing the position outlined by United States president George Bush in a meeting with Chancellor Kohl earlier that month, had already tacitly given Washington's green light for German unity. Although the French and British gradually overcame initial misgivings, Baker, and later Kohl and West German minister of foreign affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, visited Gorbachev in February to further assuage Soviet security concerns. In a meeting with Gorbachev, Baker formally presented what became known as the Nine Assurances, a collection of various Western guarantees provided to the Soviet Union to make the process of German unification more palatable.

Meanwhile, pressured by fears that East Germany might collapse (and by the conviction that the opportunity to unite the two German states would exist only as long as Gorbachev remained in power), the Kohl government began to push diplomatic negotiations toward a speedy solution of the German Question. Kohl's Ten-Point Plan was being overtaken by events.

Already in the beginning of February, discussions had begun about the introduction of West Germany's currency into East Germany. Also as a result of the quickened pace of events, the foreign ministers of the four World War II Allies and of the two German states agreed in mid-February to begin formal talks on German unity (the Two-Plus-Four Talks). The external conditions for unification were put into place.

The Two-Plus-Four Talks were intended to provide an instrument with which to shape German unification and hence the new post-Cold War world in Europe without excluding key players from the process. There were fears, in particular in Washington and Bonn, that a bitter sense of defeat and exclusion in Moscow might engender a climate analogous to that which had developed in Germany after the Treaty of Versailles and that had characterized the Weimar period. The existence of a humiliated and vanquished power that might later seek to forcibly reshape the European order (as Hitler's Germany had sought to do) was to be precluded at all costs. More immediately, United States, German, and other West European diplomats wanted to avoid creating a domestic crisis for Gorbachev, to whom most Western leaders had tied their hopes for a sustained liberal posture of the Soviet Union.

Free and fair elections for East Germany's Volkskammer (People's Chamber) were held on March 18, 1990. The result

was a victory for the CDU-led Alliance for Germany, which received a plurality of the vote. The alliance and the other parties that supported unification (the SPD, the Alliance of Free Democrats, and the German Social Union) received the votes of roughly three-fourths of the East German electorate. Opinion polls underscored the same message expressed in the election results. The vast majority of the population in the GDR rejected communism, reformed or otherwise, and supported unification with the Federal Republic.

East Germany's first (and last) democratically elected prime minister, Lothar de Maizière, promptly fulfilled his mandate. On April 19, he announced that he would seek unity with West Germany as soon as possible. As a first step, East Berlin's new government agreed with Bonn on economic and monetary union, which took place on July 1.

The external conditions governing Germany's unification had meanwhile been in process. Following the first Two-Plus-Four meeting in mid-February, subsequent meetings were held in March, June, July, and September 1990. In late June, the national legislatures in East Berlin and in Bonn approved a resolution recognizing the inviolability of Poland's borders as determined after World War II, confirming the Oder-Neisse rivers as the permanent border between Poland and the future united Germany. On August 31, 1990, the Unification Treaty was signed in East Berlin by officials of both German states. The treaty stipulated that the five newly reconstituted *Länder* in the GDR would accede to the Federal Republic on October 3, 1990, as provided for under Article 23 of the Basic Law.

The remaining external aspects relating to German unification were quickly settled. After having consented to unification, Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, had at first insisted that united Germany accept a demilitarized, neutral status. When this was rejected by West Germany, they then argued that Germany should remain in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact for a transitional period. In this context, GDR minister of national defense Admiral Theodor Hoffmann proposed in late February 1990 the creation of a joint army for united Germany (a force that would be reduced to less than one-third the combined size of the armed forces of the FRG and the GDR). He also proposed that, pending elections and further negotiations, both states continue to belong to their respective alliances.

That same month, however, following a meeting at Camp David, Chancellor Kohl and President Bush had reemphasized their commitment to unified Germany's full membership in NATO. They stressed that East Germany would initially enjoy a special military status in deference to security concerns of the Soviet Union. To this end, West German minister of foreign affairs Genscher, especially attuned to Soviet sensitivities, had formulated a plan to assuage Soviet concerns. According to Genscher's plan, NATO forces would not be moved to the territory of the former GDR.

In the early weeks of the spring of 1990, Soviet resistance to united Germany's full membership in NATO, particularly in light of the GDR's elections in March, became increasingly untenable. Finally, in mid-July, consultations among Kohl, Genscher, and Gorbachev in the Caucasian town of Stavropol secured Soviet permission for Germany to enjoy full sovereignty and remain in NATO.

A communiqué issued by NATO from London the previous week had helped to facilitate the reversal of the Soviet position as did West German largesse to the Soviet Union in the form of aid and credits. The London declaration announced that NATO had become "an indispensable factor of stability" for Europe's profound transition and hence would seek to extend the Alliance's "hand of friendship" to its former enemies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Kohl and Genscher agreed that united Germany would recommit to earlier pledges to renounce production and possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Both German states also declared on August 30, 1990, at the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks in Vienna, that the united country would reduce its armed forces to 370,000 within three to four years. West Germany's leadership also guaranteed that NATO's military organization would not be extended to GDR territory as long as Soviet forces remained stationed there. In return, Kohl obtained from Gorbachev agreement that the roughly 400,000 Soviet troops stationed in East Germany would be withdrawn by the end of 1994. The Kohl government also pledged financial assistance for the repatriation of the Soviet troops.

The Kohl-Gorbachev agreements paved the way for signing the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, or, as it is more commonly known, the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, on September 12, 1990. Within this framework, the two German

states, together with the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, were able to confirm the unification of Germany as consisting of the GDR, the FRG, and Berlin. In addition, the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation in September 1990. That same month, the GDR's minister of defense and disarmament and the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces concluded an agreement that provided for the GDR's immediate withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

Bonn and Warsaw also concluded a separate treaty that took into account the special concerns Poland had about its security. For a period of time, the topic of the German-Polish border had proved a controversial and divisive issue for coalition politics in Bonn and for the unification process in general. Kohl's reluctance to declare the issue settled, stemming from legal concerns as well as domestic political considerations, fueled anxieties in Poland and elsewhere in Europe about the course of a united Germany. On June 21, 1990, however, both German parliaments had passed resolutions recognizing Poland's western border as final, stipulating that a separate treaty between Poland and a united Germany would formally consummate this understanding.

On October 1, 1990, all Four-Power rights in Germany and Berlin ended when representatives of the four victorious countries in World War II signed a document in New York recognizing full German sovereignty. On October 3, the Unification Treaty went into effect, and the five new *Länder* formed in the territory of the former GDR acceded to the Federal Republic as provided for under Article 23 of the Basic Law.

Foreign Reaction to Unification

German unification upset the political equilibrium in many of Western and Eastern Europe's political establishments. Although French public opinion had tended to support German unity, French leaders feared that a resurgent united Germany would dominate Europe and usurp their aspirations to play a leading role on the continent. President Mitterrand's trip to the GDR in December 1989, when he cautioned the East Germans against hasty unification, illustrated this sentiment.

In Britain, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government harbored fears that German unification would accelerate European unification, quickening and deepening the gap between

The departure of the United States, British, and French city commanders from Berlin in 1991
Joyous crowds at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin in November 1989
Courtesy German Information Center, New York

London and the continent. Nicholas Ridley, an official in the Thatcher government, was forced to step down in the summer of 1990 in the wake of impolitic remarks he made about European economic union's being a German design for the domination of Europe. Thatcher, for her part, initially urged Chancellor Kohl's government to be patient on unification and only with reluctance later joined the United States in its prounity stance.

In the former Soviet bloc, aside from the Soviet Union, Poland sheltered the greatest distrust and suspicion of developments in Germany. These anxieties accounted for the separate treaty signed between united Germany and Poland in November 1990. The treaty confirmed the border (stipulated in the Two-Plus-Four Talks) and also outlined principles for good-neighborliness and cooperation between Warsaw and Bonn.

From the United States perspective, after offering Germany support for unification, President Bush promptly sought to reshape the German-United States alliance from a relationship in which West Germany had served as a junior partner to a more equal status in which Germany would become a "partner in leadership." Germany's changing relationship with the United States was in fact already evident. For example, it was without prior consultation with Washington that Chancellor Kohl and Soviet president Gorbachev had reached their agreement on the limit of 370,000 troops for Germany's armed forces, the Bundeswehr (West Germany had roughly 495,000 troops under arms in 1990; the GDR, 170,000) and the exclusion of NATO troops from the territory of eastern Germany.

Postunification Developments

United Germany, a state with 80 million inhabitants and an area bordering nine countries in Central Europe, confronted a daunting array of responsibilities and expectations with regard to its international role in the early 1990s. Following unification, its government adopted a policy aimed at fully integrating the newly enlarged Federal Republic into the primary instruments of international cooperation: the EC, NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE. In a deliberate effort to further assuage the concerns of its neighbors about German dominance on the continent, Bonn worked assiduously to bolster its multilateralist image.

President von Weizsäcker, Chancellor Kohl, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher all went to great lengths to stress Germany's intention to renounce the power politics of past eras in favor of a "policy of responsibility." In the German view, this meant, on the one hand, a continuation of West German foreign policy based on the use of nonmilitary instruments. On the other hand, it meant a higher international profile in economic, human rights, and environmental issues. With the end of the Cold War, economic power, in the view of many officials and policy experts in Europe, had superseded military power in terms of political influence. Germans, above all, adhered to this belief.

At times, however, German foreign policy was self-centered. Squabbling over German interest rates (both in Europe and in the United States) in the autumn of 1992 underscored what many perceived as a new tilt toward German self-absorption and unilateralism that had been established the previous winter through Germany's policy toward the Balkans. Until the summer of 1991, Germany's policy toward Yugoslavia had mirrored the thinking in Washington and European capitals, namely, that Yugoslav unity should be preserved. For a number of domestic reasons, however, Bonn began to shift away from this policy, finally deciding on unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991.

In general, united Germany's foreign policy followed the resolutely multilateral stance developed in the postwar period. The German government played an enthusiastic role in the environmental summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, emphasizing the importance it attached to international ecological concerns in its foreign policy. In the area of international aid, Bonn established criteria for developmental assistance based on a recipient country's respect for human rights, commitment to democracy and a market economy, and responsibility in arms development and procurement.

In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Germany led the international aid effort for the former Soviet Union and for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Aid to Russia was paramount for policy makers in Bonn for a variety of reasons, including the desire to expedite the withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Germany and the wish to enhance Germany's security by promoting democracy and a market economy in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union's successor states.

Because of these vital concerns, the German government emerged as an important champion of aid to the former Soviet bloc. Chancellor Kohl repeatedly prodded his Western partners toward what he often termed "fair international burden-sharing" with regard to aid for the emerging democracies in the former Soviet bloc. The US$24 billion aid package of the Group of Seven (G–7—see Glossary) for Russia in April 1992 had come about to a large extent as a result of German insistence. In April 1993, the G–7 announced an additional aid package for Russia totaling approximately US$50 billion. By this time, German aid to the successor states of the Soviet Union totaled more than DM90 billion (for value of the deutsche mark—see Glossary). According to Chancellor Kohl, this amount represented more than half of all Western contributions since 1989. German aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS—see Glossary) included export credit guarantees for long-term loans; sustained support for the withdrawal and reintegration of CIS troops stationed in eastern Germany; financial help to aid the CIS in its development of market institutions and infrastructure; and more than DM100 million in bilateral and multilateral aid to improve safety standards in Soviet-designed nuclear power plants.

Part of German aid to the CIS was to provide for the material well-being of the estimated 2 million ethnic Germans who still resided in former Soviet republics. This aid was designed to offer incentives for ethnic Germans to remain in Russia and in other CIS states rather than to emigrate to Germany, where they had the right to become citizens of the Federal Republic and receive significant amounts of help in becoming integrated into the homeland of their ancestors (see Immigration, ch. 3). The German government has even discussed with Russian representatives the possibility of restoring the "Volga Republic" disbanded by Joseph Stalin in 1941 as a possible area of settlement for ethnic Germans in Russia.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the subject of ethnic German minorities has played a role in German foreign policy. By the mid-1990s, German-Czech relations, for example, still had not been fully normalized, to a large extent because expellee groups in the Federal Republic continued to lobby for restitution or compensation for property owned by Germans in the former Czechoslovakia and confiscated after World War II. The German-Czech Friendship Treaty was signed in 1992, but it

failed to address the question of compensation for Czech victims of Nazism.

Foreign Policy Formulation

Institutional Framework

Structural weaknesses of the German central government were deliberately crafted during the years of Allied occupation (1945–49) to preclude the possibility that extremists could once again return to government (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 7). The chancellor, the cabinet, and the legislature all contribute to the policy-making process. Moreover, power is divided between the federal and *Land* governments. Foreign policy is the prerogative of the federal government, but *Länder* are permitted to conclude agreements with foreign countries; such agreements in turn are subject to approval by the federal government.

Article 65 of the Basic Law stipulates that the federal chancellor is responsible for general policy, and the Federal Chancellery (the chancellor's office) serves as the center for policy review and coordination. The chancellor's direct executive role is limited, however. Although he or she has wide powers to name political appointees in government, the chancellor does not enjoy complete freedom in making appointments to cabinet posts. Political necessity demands, for instance, the guarantee of a number of cabinet posts to coalition partners. In 1995, for example, important portfolios, such as economics and foreign affairs, were controlled by the FDP, Helmut Kohl's junior coalition partner. The resulting diversity of views at the highest level of government accounts for sustained policy splits and a process in which it is at times difficult to resolve particularly contentious issues.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the central department for planning and implementing foreign policy. Like the United States, Germany has a corps of professional diplomats. Those wishing to join Germany's foreign service may file their application once a year. Successful candidates undergo a two-year training program. About one-third of Germany's diplomats are lawyers.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shares responsibility for foreign economic policy with the Ministry for Economics and the Ministry of Finance; security policy is coordinated with the Ministry of Defense. Although the executive branch generally

takes the initiative in foreign affairs, the Bundestag (the lower house of parliament) and the Bundesrat (the upper house of parliament) are involved in the policy-making process. These bodies ratify foreign treaties and approve most legislation and budgetary provisions. Parliamentary groups (*Fraktionen*; sing., *Fraktion*) in the Bundestag and various committees pertaining to foreign affairs provide organizational structure for the policy-making process.

Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy

Foreign Policy Positions of the Political Parties

Members of Kohl's CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union—CSU), assert that transatlantic links should be given priority over more European-dominated organizations such as the CSCE, especially in the discussion of security matters. They also stress that assumption of responsibility in international affairs would necessarily demand a resolution of the "out-of-area" debate, that is, whether Germany would be allowed to participate alongside Alliance partners in future military operations.

The CSU has distinguished itself from the CDU by pushing a slightly more confident tone regarding what its members perceive as German national interests. Notable in this regard were CSU demands that Bonn and Prague renegotiate a friendship treaty to give greater emphasis to property claims of ethnic Germans (living mostly in Bavaria) who had emigrated or been expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II. In May 1992, the CSU announced that it would vote against the German-Czechoslovak friendship treaty in the Bundesrat.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher's party, the FDP, is perhaps the least nationalistic and the most multilateral in philosophy of the German political parties when it comes to the subject of foreign policy. Although FDP voters, like those of the CDU, strongly favor membership in NATO and rapid European unification, FDP supporters have stressed to a greater extent than the other parties the importance of CSCE institutions and policies aimed at arms control and arms reductions. Holding views markedly different in this regard than those held by the CDU/CSU, FDP voters place far less emphasis on the participation of German soldiers in peacekeeping and peacemaking missions under UN auspices.

Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher with Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd during the Two-Plus-Four Talks in Bonn in May 1990
Courtesy German Information Center, New York

On foreign policy issues, the SPD is distinct in a number of ways from the ruling coalition government in Bonn. Like the FDP, the SPD is a strong supporter of the CSCE but favors greater restrictions on out-of-area missions for the Bundeswehr. Although fundamentally multilateralist in sentiment (the SPD supports a United States of Europe and more responsibility for the UN in collective security), the SPD is apt to express its desire that Germany play a singular and special role in international relations because of its recent troubled history. A survey taken in the early 1990s found that 35 percent of SPD voters preferred a neutral status for united Germany. Of the major political parties, the SDP is the biggest supporter of neutrality and on balance offers the lowest support for NATO.

The Greens (Die Grünen), a western German environmentalist party, united in 1993 with an eastern German political group, Alliance 90 (Bündnis 90), to form Alliance 90/The Greens, commonly called the Greens. Surveys from the early 1990s found that one-third of the traditionally pacifist Green voters supported continued membership in NATO. Nearly 50 percent backed European unity. Although the Greens adamantly opposed German participation in Operation Desert Storm, some members have begun to call for a multilateral military intervention in the Balkan war. However, they either eschew the question of or oppose German involvement.

Other small parties, such as the PDS and the right-wing radical Republikaner (Die Republikaner—REP), are either opposed to or reluctant to support German membership in NATO and reject European integration (according to the Republikaner) as subordinating German interests to a pan-European bureaucratic architecture. Neither the PDS nor the Republikaner played a significant role in mainstream debate during the first several years following unification.

Public Opinion

After unification, Germany soon became confident about its greater responsibility in international relations. According to a 1991 Rand Corporation survey, 62 percent of the population said they thought that Germany should pursue a more active international role. Some 77 percent voiced the opinion that their country was best suited to play the leading foreign policy role in Europe. There were even signs that Germans were coming to terms with the idea of international military intervention. In 1992 about 53 percent of Germans (compared with 43 percent the previous year) said they believed that the use of military force is justified when principles of international law and human rights are violated.

The reluctance of Germans to think in terms of their country's involvement in multilateral military actions remained high, however. Although 53 percent supported participation of the Bundeswehr in peacekeeping operations after unification, barely 33 percent favored German military involvement in NATO operations outside of German territory. Only 20 percent were sympathetic to the idea of German forces participating in collective security actions such as Operation Desert Storm. A 1994 follow-up study by the Rand Corporation found increasing support in German public opinion for a German

defense role beyond the country's borders. But data also reflected uncertainty about what that role should entail.

In the aftermath of communism's demise, Germans, especially Germans living in the old *Länder,* continued to believe that NATO was essential to their security. They did so even though the contours of a distinct threat had not emerged and even though Germany's new international role remained very much in question. A 1990–91 study by the Rand Corporation commissioned by the United States Air Force discovered that 85 percent of the German populace supported membership in international alliances in general, with two out of three western Germans considering NATO essential for their security. (A West German Emnid poll in the autumn of 1988 had shown 86 percent favoring NATO membership.) By contrast, only 35 percent of eastern Germans considered NATO indispensable. The fact that western Germans made up roughly four-fifths of united Germany's population and that western Germans dominated the united country's policy establishment led most analysts to conclude that the addition of eastern Germany would have a minimal impact on the Federal Republic's foreign policy.

The German position on the presence of United States troops remains one of ambivalence. According to the Rand study, 57 percent supported a complete withdrawal of United States troops from the territory of the Federal Republic. Western Germans were divided in their view—43 percent favoring and 49 percent rejecting the sustained presence of these troops. Eastern Germans demonstrated greater consensus on the issue of United States troops, with 84 percent opposing a future United States military presence.

When asked why one should support NATO in the post-Cold War era, western Germans gave as the primary reason the fact that the defense organization had become a fixture on the political landscape over the course of previous decades and had done a good job in maintaining peace on the continent. Few respondents felt that NATO should have more military responsibilities, however. In fact, 42 percent voiced apprehension that NATO could be used in the future to draw Germany into conflicts where its interests were not represented. The impressions from these results were roughly aligned with the findings from polls conducted by German institutes during the same time frame. In 1991 a majority of Germans regarded Switzerland—a neutral although not demilitarized state—as an

appropriate model for the new Germany's role in international affairs.

The Out-of-Area Debate

Immediately after unification, the prevailing interpretation of the Basic Law allowed for the Federal Republic's participation in systems of collective security but precluded its armed forces from any activity not specifically attributable to the country's defense, unless explicitly authorized elsewhere in the constitution. Article 26 of the Basic Law forbids any act of war or aggression, and Article 87 stipulates that German military forces are permitted to become involved only in defense actions. The question of German participation in out-of-area operations played an important role in German foreign policy debates of the early 1990s.

The interpretation that combat missions outside the traditional area covered by NATO are not permitted under the constitution had been ratified by a decision by the SPD-led government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974–82) in April 1981. This view was reconfirmed in 1983 by the new Kohl government soon after it took power.

The debate on out-of-area operations during the Persian Gulf War led to a consensus by the major political parties—although for varying reasons—that rather than reinterpretation, the constitution was in need of amendment to allow German forces to assume a new role in collective security. Amending the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Conflict arose, first because the opposition SPD rejected the idea of an amendment, then later because neither the SPD nor the other parties could agree on the precise provisions of such an amendment.

The SPD insisted that an amendment to the constitution allow for German participation in UN peacekeeping operations only. This position was reached after heated debate at the party's convention in May 1991, and even then, only with the strong push of SPD leader Björn Engholm and the party's moderate faction. The measure passed by the relatively small margin of 230 to 179. The SPD stopped short of supporting German participation in combat missions sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which means that in the future, operations such as Desert Storm would not mandate German involvement.

Citing special constraints stemming from German history and fears that Germany, against its own interests, would be drawn into conflicts by other powers (notably the United States), the SPD envisioned a narrow set of circumstances for the deployment of German forces. These included a mandate by the UN Security Council; a cease-fire; consent of the warring parties; operational control by the UN; and the participation of other European countries. The SPD's position also reflected the party's devotion to the idea that diplomatic and economic means, and only rarely, if ever, the military, could provide for Germany's defense and security.

The FDP followed the lead outlined by Genscher, its dovish foreign minister, and, like the SPD, agreed on restricting the Bundeswehr's activities to blue-helmet peacekeeping missions. An amendment to the constitution would explicitly require UN authorization for out-of-area deployments, even when Germans were participating within NATO and WEU units. In an attempt to further limit the opportunity for actual combat involvement and to stress the European character of the new German state, the FDP also stipulated that fighting missions be permitted only when other EC members were present.

The CDU was predictably not satisfied with restrictions that provided exclusively for blue-helmet missions. Members of the CDU and the CSU had initially argued that an amendment to the constitution was not necessary in order for German troops to cooperate in multilateral military operations abroad. They pointed to Article 24(2), of the Basic Law, which empowers the Federal Republic to participate in systems of collective security such as the UN. Proponents of this argument rejected the idea that the term "defense," as applied in Article 87a(2) of the Basic Law, should be interpreted narrowly and tied exclusively to the defense of Germany or of an alliance partner.

Nevertheless, Kohl's party had agreed that the constitution must be amended in order to permit German troops a role in peacekeeping and peacemaking missions abroad. Kohl's party wanted not only UN missions mandated by the constitution but also NATO and WEU out-of-area missions. In the view of leading defense experts in the CDU, these were the only organizations capable of providing defense. Neither the UN nor the CSCE, favorites of the FDP and the SPD, were considered viable instruments of military action. Some more outspoken members of the CDU and CSU favored a reduction of all constraints on the exercise of German power in an attempt to

equalize the Federal Republic's room for maneuvering with Britain and France.

Minister of Defense Volker Rühe strongly argued in favor of Germany's assuming full and normal responsibilities in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations within the Alliance. But he also frequently stressed that German public opinion would only gradually adapt to its new international circumstance.

In an attempt to sensitize the German public to changes in the international climate and the united country's emerging responsibilities, the Kohl government had been incrementally enlarging German military participation in operations abroad, arguably within the confines of the constitution. Bonn allowed German minesweepers and their crews to operate in the Persian Gulf from April through July 1991 after the war had ended, justifying the mission on humanitarian grounds. The German government used Bundeswehr personnel to supply transportation and to assist in the establishment of refugee camps in Iran and Iraq for Kurds, who had been persecuted by Iraqi forces. German military medical personnel were assigned in May 1992 to participate in the UN mission in Cambodia. German military units joined in the UN's humanitarian effort in Somalia in 1992–93, but only after arduous parliamentary debate. German forces also were involved in the Adriatic when UN forces monitored compliance with the internationally imposed arms embargo by parties in the Yugoslav conflict. In an important decision of July 12, 1994, Germany's highest court, the Federal Constitutional Court, ruled that German troops can take part in both UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, as long as the Bundestag approves each operation by a simple majority. The court also stated that Germany can assign forces to NATO and WEU operations directed at implementing resolutions of the UN Security Council. Thus, the decision cleared the way for a German military role beyond the country's and NATO's current borders, and German fliers subsequently participated in NATO missions over Bosnia.

The conduct of foreign policy continues to belong to the domain of the executive branch of government in Germany. But the highly controversial and emotional debate concerning German participation in peacekeeping and peacemaking missions abroad has meant that the Bundestag will continue to be directly involved in the actual decision-making process.

International Cooperation

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

During the Cold War era, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was central to the formulation and implementation of West Germany's foreign and defense policies. In 1954 and 1955 (the year the Warsaw Pact was established), agreements were reached by the Allied powers to end the occupation of the Federal Republic and grant West Germany sovereignty. It was in conjunction with these decisions that West Germany had been permitted to rearm and to obtain membership in the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. Nevertheless, under the Western European Union Treaty of May 1955, the Federal Republic was prohibited from possessing weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, all West German armed forces were assigned to NATO and could not operate out of area.

During the Cold War, the underlying tone of NATO's strategy shifted at times to accommodate the changing security environment in the United States and in Europe. For example, in 1967 the Harmel Report, developed during the advent of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik in Germany, helped initiate the West's dual strategy of defense and détente with the Soviet bloc. The Harmel Report's aversion to confrontation was further amplified by the 1975 Helsinki Accords, or the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE was to provide a framework for cooperation between NATO and Warsaw Pact members by intensifying contacts and respecting the inviolability of Eastern Europe's postwar borders.

Despite the prevailing climate of détente in the 1970s, NATO remained for the United States and its allies the principal instrument with which to deter Soviet aggression on the continent and if necessary to defend the West European democracies from attack by the Warsaw Pact. To this end, the role of the Federal Republic was indispensable. West Germany was the frontline state and home to the largest concentration of United States troops and NATO-controlled nuclear weapons in the European theater. Across the border in the GDR, the Soviet Union had amassed its greatest number of troops outside its own territory.

Since its founding, NATO had served other functions as well. After World War II, policy makers in Washington and in

major European capitals had sought to curb and control German power by wedding the West German state to multilateral institutions. Hence, NATO (and to some extent the EC) was designed not only as an instrument with which to keep the Soviet Union out of Western Europe but also as a means to constrain Germany from returning to the expansionist behavior that had characterized its foreign policy in the first half of the century. Thus, NATO's purpose was often said to reflect a strategy of double containment: to contain the Soviet Union as well as Germany. In addition, NATO was also to perform the broader function of muting the traditional regional rivalries that had previously undermined Europe's peace and stability.

As far as West Germany was concerned, it practiced what was often referred to as a policy of self-containment. West Germany's postwar leaders deliberately subjugated national interests to the stated objectives of the EC and NATO. Embracing federalism and the inculcation of democratic values, the West German public and political elites also accepted Germany's adjustment to the role of civilian power and junior partner in the Alliance. Once the economic miracle had taken place and the reconstruction of Germany had given way to prosperity, this development in the German posture was reflected in the adage that the West German democracy was "an economic giant but a political dwarf."

Although NATO's primary raison d'être collapsed with the disintegration of the Soviet empire (in Germany the GDR's armed forces were absorbed by the Bundeswehr), new uncertainties and instabilities in the international climate after 1989 led many observers to conclude that the Atlantic Alliance, which came into force in April 1949, ought to remain intact. Many viewed NATO's expansion to the east as a necessary means to ensure the security of the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Others continued to view NATO as a means to prevent the renationalization of German security policy. Questions about united Germany's role in international affairs in general, and in a revamped NATO in particular, became paramount to policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the early summer of 1992, NATO officials announced that the Alliance was prepared to assume a peacekeeping role in Europe beyond the border of its sixteen member states. According to a plan approved at the June 1992 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Oslo, NATO would henceforth con-

sider contributing troops, supplies, and logistical support to CSCE peacekeeping missions. Clearer details regarding NATO's new military mission, however, remained in doubt in the mid-1990s.

NATO had already begun to grapple with questions about its future during the Two-Plus-Four Talks. The London Declaration on NATO of July 6, 1990, articulated a vision that kept the NATO treaty in force as a factor of stability across Europe. Reflecting a fundamental change of atmosphere precipitated by communism's collapse, NATO members committed themselves to transforming the Western Alliance from adversary to friend for the members of the former Soviet bloc. Illustrating this transformation were the visits of Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel and Polish president Lech Walesa to NATO Headquarters in Brussels in early 1991. In fact, by the end of that same year Russian president Boris Yeltsin suggested that his own country might apply for NATO membership.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher was a staunch proponent of institutionalizing cooperative links between East and West. In the Declaration on Peace and Cooperation adopted on November 8, 1991, leaders of the sixteen NATO nations meeting in Rome submitted to eight Central and East European countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) and the Soviet Union proposals to institutionalize consultations among former adversaries on a broad range of security concerns.

Because many Central and East European countries were beset with ethnic tensions in the early 1990s and still had unresolved border disputes with neighbors, NATO officials felt it unreasonable to anticipate early NATO membership. Short of full membership, however, former members of the Warsaw Pact were invited to join Western states to form the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The NACC had been proposed at the initiative of Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher and Secretary of State Baker at the end of 1991.

The NACC began by mid-1992 to hold regular meetings at the ministerial or ambassadorial level with various NATO committees and authorities tasked with the oversight of military, political, and economic issues of concern to member states. In April 1993, German Minister of Defense Rühe traveled to Moscow to sign the first extensive agreement between Russian and German armed forces. Under the ten-year agreement, a wide

range of contacts between Russian and German officers would take place.

In the context of this new collaborative posture between West and East, NATO members had already pledged themselves to a smaller, restructured field of active forces, reduced training and exercises, and enhanced flexibility and cooperative dialogue in deciding how to respond to future international crises. Also as a result of the London Declaration, which declared NATO's forward posture in Europe no longer necessary, NATO countries had begun to reduce or withdraw their forces from the Central European theater, and from Germany in particular.

NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), launched in January 1994, sought even stronger links between democratic countries of the former Soviet bloc and the Alliance. Membership in the PfP enabled these countries to consult with NATO and cooperate in joint multilateral crisis activities.

In the 1990s, the predominant view held by the mainstream of Germany's defense establishment is that NATO remains essential for German security for three primary reasons: the Alliance is a crucial source of stability for a continent in the throes of profound transformations; NATO serves as an indispensable bridge to the United States and functionally helps to counter that country's neo-isolationism by maintaining a visible United States presence in Europe; and NATO remains the only viable instrument for German and European defense, given that the EU, WEU, and OSCE are all still untested in the coordination and implementation of defense policies.

Western European Union

The EC had also taken steps during the first post-Cold War years to enhance its competence in foreign affairs. In the Treaty on European Union, signed on February 7, 1992, in Maastricht, representatives of the EC's twelve members agreed to take steps toward developing a common European foreign and defense policy. The treaty (commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty) stipulated that the European Council, composed of the heads of state and government in the member states, would decide together on guidelines that would frame a common foreign and security policy. The council would also monitor the implementation of policies agreed upon. In conjunction with this diplomatic consensus, it was agreed that the Western European Union (WEU), after decades of relative dor-

mancy, would become the primary instrument with which the continent would enhance its own defense capability.

Some European proponents suggested that the WEU could act as a complement to NATO by serving in capacities in which NATO would not. The WEU, for example, recognized no formal geographic limits to its potential operations. Those in the United States critical of moves to revive the WEU, however, suggested that a European defense structure was redundant and could evolve as a competitor for NATO resources and personnel. Italy and Britain proposed that the WEU become an arm of NATO, rather than an independent European security structure. NATO formally supported the process toward a European defense identity but emphasized that the Atlantic Alliance should remain the primary forum for the discussion of European security issues.

In Germany's view, the WEU, as the defense arm of the EU, would complement NATO. The December 1991 EC summit in Maastricht declared that the WEU would serve as an instrument of European defense and as such would have the effect of strengthening the European pillar of NATO.

Members of the WEU, meeting in Bonn on November 18, 1991, had issued a communiqué expressing a desire for enhanced dialogue with the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the Soviet Union. This represented a parallel step to that which NATO had already taken through creation of the NACC. The Bonn communiqué announced that foreign and defense ministers from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania would be invited to take part in special meetings with members of the WEU Council and would be invited to participate in WEU-organized seminars in various European countries. The WEU also committed itself to creating a fact-finding mission to the former Soviet republics to further investigate meaningful ways in which security dialogue could be fostered.

The Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 empowered the WEU member states with significant room for maneuver. Germany's new minister of foreign affairs, Klaus Kinkel, and Minister of Defense Rühe endorsed the WEU's intention not only to maintain peace but also to enforce it if necessary, even in areas outside the Alliance.

Europe's development of a common foreign and defense policy and its establishment of a mature wing of the Western Alliance that would act as a complement to NATO underscored

the development of Europe as a new world power center. Some suggested that united Europe should receive a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. They noted that a united Europe would have more inhabitants than the United States and Japan combined and its gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) would be larger than that of the United States.

Eurocorps

Germany remained determined to pursue a multitracked approach in the development of its foreign and defense policies. The Germans firmly rejected subordination of European integration to other priorities that would, among other things in the German view, endanger the mutually important relationship that Bonn and Paris had carefully cultivated since the end of World War II.

West Germany's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (1949–63), together with French president Charles de Gaulle, had worked assiduously to dismantle the historical enmity between their two countries and to lay the foundation for German-French reconciliation after World War II (see Rearmament and the European Defense Community, ch. 2). West Germany had become France's most important trading partner by the 1980s (accounting for 40 percent of French trade), and the 1983 revival of the defense clauses in the German-French Friendship Treaty (Élysée Treaty) of 1963 had allowed a deepening of the two countries' military ties. Thus on October 16, 1991, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand first announced a plan proposing that the WEU become the EC's defense arm and that a Franco-German Eurocorps (based on an already existing brigade) serve as the core of a new European army.

The decision by Kohl's government to develop a Franco-German Eurocorps was to be seen in this context (Germany and France had also been frustrated by the British domination of NATO's rapid reaction force established in 1991). The Eurocorps not only would provide the basis for a European force but also, on a political level, would assuage French (and broader European) concerns about a return to German unilateralism in foreign and defense policy. It had been French policy since the end of World War II to oppose any move by the Federal Republic perceived as leading to the establishment of a German national foreign and defense policy.

In the face of criticism from the NATO establishment, the Germans argued that the Eurocorps would have the positive

Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel with Pope John Paul II in December 1993 Courtesy German Information Center, New York

effect of drawing the French closer to the Atlantic Alliance. French troops belonging to the joint military corps could be made available to NATO, either as rapid deployment forces or as main defense forces, the Germans argued. Skeptics—the Dutch, for instance—contended, on the contrary, that the Eurocorps would actually decrease the number of French and German troops available to NATO. Although Germans claimed that the joint military corps would intensify French links to NATO, it was also undoubtedly true that the collaborative step was viewed as an altogether different opportunity by the French defense establishment, long dominated by elements favoring an independent European security identity.

It was not exclusively in France, although perhaps most prominently, that some strategic thinkers sought to "Europeanize" the continent's defense by seeing to it that certain NATO functions were delegated to the EC or the WEU. Not surprisingly, Bonn's moves to help develop the Eurocorps provoked concern and in some circles irritation among NATO advocates both in the United States and in Europe. The Netherlands, Britain, and Denmark all expressed various degrees of reservation or opposition to the corps. Britain and the Netherlands in particular were reluctant to accept the premise that a European defense could be dominated by the French and the Ger-

mans. Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg, however, welcomed the German-French initiative to form a joint military corps, and eventually all these countries pledged troops to it.

The Eurocorps was formally proposed by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand in May 1992. Both leaders invited all members of the WEU to participate. The headquarters for the corps was established in Strasbourg in July 1992, and the corps was scheduled to become operational by late 1995. At the time of its inception, the corps was to have three military functions: to join and assist NATO missions; to fulfill missions under WEU command outside traditional NATO territory; and to provide international humanitarian assistance.

Germans balanced their push for European security structures in the early 1990s by repeatedly stressing their commitment to NATO. NATO remained central to German foreign and defense policies because of the organization's institutional ties to the United States, a fact that caused unrest in the French foreign policy establishment and among like-minded thinkers in Germany, who sought evolution away from an alliance dominated by the United States. A middle ground was sought by some defense experts who, like Bundeswehr *General Inspekteur* Klaus Naumann, contended that a "more European NATO" would appropriately bring balance to the previously United States-dominated defense organization.

European Union

Since its creation in 1957, the central objective of the European Community (EC—see Glossary) has been to advance the economic integration of Western Europe, primarily through the reduction or elimination of barriers to free trade and investment. The EC has long enjoyed a high level of sustained popularity in West Germany. Building on this foundation of support, West German leaders in the late 1980s set out to pursue, in concert with other West European states (Britain and some of the smaller countries in northern Europe did not participate), the objective of a more complete political and economic union (see Germany in the European Economy, ch. 6).

The Single European Act of 1986–87, designed to create a single common market without internal frontiers, was implemented in principle on January 1, 1993. In December 1991, EC leaders met in Maastricht to reach agreement on the Draft Treaty on Political Union. As a consequence of the treaty, Europe was committed to the creation of a common currency,

set to begin in 1999 at the latest. At Maastricht, EC heads of state, in addition to agreeing on a path to political union, also agreed to the goal of establishing a common foreign and defense policy. The Maastricht Treaty provided the foundation for a federalized United States of Europe by creating the European Union (EU—see Glossary), of which the EC is a part.

In part as a consequence of the momentous changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, steps toward European unity suffered setbacks in the early 1990s. War in Yugoslavia and the inability of the EC to fashion a cogent and effective response decimated the infant concept of a common defense policy. Meanwhile, mired in the uncertainties about Maastricht's chances for ratification during the autumn of 1991, Europe's financial markets were driven into a brief convulsive episode in September, with the result that EC efforts to impose a common financial discipline were effectively undermined.

At the same time, popular opinion in EC countries signaled that their own elected leaders and EC bureaucrats had lost touch with their respective electorates' concerns. Paramount were popular fears in Europe about a loss of sovereignty and national identity and the uncontrollable expansion of the EC's bureaucracy. Although political elites in Germany remained firmly committed to Maastricht, the German public was especially restive about the potential loss of the deutsche mark—the country's symbol of postwar economic success and in some respects its postnational identity. Roughly 70 percent of Germans rejected the notion that they should trade their vaunted currency for an untested European currency, the European currency unit (ECU—see Glossary).

In the wake of votes in Denmark and in France against ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Chancellor Kohl showed no loss of overall optimism. Continuation of the process of European integration had been a central foreign policy objective of the Federal Republic. Following a special one-day EC summit in Birmingham, England, on October 16, 1992, Kohl proclaimed that the "European locomotive [would] continue," because all EC members still voiced a desire to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. In a speech before the Bundestag delivered three weeks earlier, Kohl had restated his support for what he interpreted as the treaty's five main objectives: common foreign and security policies; development of an economic and monetary union; development of common policy on domestic security

matters; intensified cooperation in environmental protection; and enhancement of the role of the European Parliament.

In political terms, German officials viewed the Maastricht Treaty as a way to reassure European neighbors of Germany's trustworthiness as an international partner. To this end, in fact, Germany had actually sought a special leadership role of sorts. In October 1992, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinkel stressed his country's unique responsibility, as the most populated and economically strongest country in Europe, "to send a signal of confidence in a common future to our still-hesitant partners." Germany (where only parliamentary approval was required) approved the treaty in December of the same year.

Indeed, many Europeans, the French perhaps in particular, interpreted the Maastricht Treaty as a German containment policy. EC president Jacques Delors had already sought to place German unification within the EC framework. Rather bluntly, during the weeks prior to the country's referendum, a number of Maastricht's supporters in France had argued that European unity would serve as an instrument with which to bind and tame the newly united Germans. French opponents of the treaty, conversely (and ironically), contended that European union would inevitably be controlled by an overwhelmingly powerful Germany. British prime minister Thatcher later stated essentially the same view, calling for a halt to the process of European union, whose final form would inevitably be dominated by the Germans. Indeed, because of its economic size and success, at the time of unification Germany presented a foreboding economic appearance on the European landscape.

In principle, united Germany is not in a position to advance its own agenda within the EU without compromise and consensus. On larger issues, approval by all EU members is required. On minor legislation, a weighted majority voting is applied, meaning that Germany has the same number of votes as France or Britain. Nevertheless, few would dispute the incomparable importance of German support in the EU for significant policy initiatives. Likewise, a strong German effort to implement a policy could be opposed in practice only with considerable difficulty.

A new German confidence, provoking irritation from Germany's allies and partners within the EC, became evident during the first years after unification. Member states fighting recession in the early 1990s blamed Germany's refusal to lower interest rates on Bonn's irresponsible self-absorption with its

domestic issues. Through tight-fisted monetary policies, critics argued, the Germans were forcing their European neighbors to pay for the high and unexpected costs of unification. The United States also called on Germany to lower its interest rates to stimulate the international economy.

In addition to economic disagreements, Bonn's policy toward the Balkans in the second half of 1991 provoked charges of unilateralism and strong-arm tactics both within the EC and in Washington, as Bonn attempted to convince its EC partners and allies to recognize the Yugoslav breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia. A number of European governments, notably Britain and France, tended to view German policy through the lens of the world wars. German policy was not driven, however, by resurgent hegemonic impulses toward the region, as some critics argued. In fact, German motives were varied.

On the one hand, Germany made it clear that it wished to see the principle of self-determination applied in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, domestic considerations also played an important role. The unofficial lobby of several hundred thousand guest workers from Croatia and the millions of West Germans who had vacationed in Zagreb and along Croatia's Dalmatian coast strongly expressed their horror at the daily bloodshed they viewed on television.

In this context, and ignoring reservations among a number of EC members, Germany unilaterally recognized Croatia and Slovenia before Christmas 1991. Germany's recognition forced the EC to follow suit by January 15, 1992. The United States, after initial opposition over the recognition policy, recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. These developments led Chancellor Kohl to declare that the recognitions represented a major "success for German and European policy." Some European observers were left chagrined, however, by what they saw as the diplomatic flexing of united Germany's muscles.

The Yugoslav case aside, it had become clear in the early 1990s that the EC's policy toward the former Soviet bloc would be shaped to a large extent by German interests. Germany above all was preoccupied with fostering stability and prosperity in the region, especially in neighboring Central and Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s, Germany had established itself as the leading donor of aid, the single largest investor, and the most important trading partner for the former Soviet bloc. In

addition to assisting democratic and market reforms, the expansion of economic and commercial ties was of direct benefit to German industry.

In the first years immediately after unification, Germany established bilateral agreements and treaties on good neighborly relations and friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. In the case of the last three, Germany pledged to help set up contacts with EU member states.

German policy makers soon began to advocate expanding the EU by admitting northern and eastern European countries as members. Germany's interest in this so-called "widening" of the EU appeared at times in conflict with France's preference for a "deepening" of the western structures of the EU before taking on new members. In the French view, new members, including Austria, Sweden, and Finland, strengthened Germany's hand in the EU and, as a consequence, diminished France's influence in the organization.

Although it remained unclear in the mid-1990s just how quickly the EU might expand in membership, it was evident that the EU would search for ways to include the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. With strong German support, the EU had begun to develop, for example, association agreements or "European agreements" that were intended to offer former communist countries access to EU markets to sell their goods. The EU also sought to provide a framework for economic and technical cooperation and for political and cultural dialogue.

At least on a rhetorical level, EU officials, in accord with the goals of the 1957 Treaty on the European Economic Community, envisaged the gradual establishment of a free-trade area for industrial products. To this end, the EU pledged to dismantle barriers to the access of industrial goods from Central and East European countries at a quicker pace than the partners were required to remove trade barriers to EU goods. This step was to be supplemented, when economic conditions in applicant countries existed, by the free movements of capital, services, and labor. Legal foundations of the new economic systems would also be required to conform with the EU model.

The EU's track record of stubborn adherence in certain instances to restrictive trade practices (especially in the agricultural and textile sector), however, raised profound questions about the feasibility of a smooth and relatively prompt EU

membership for Europe's developing democracies. Nonetheless, in the first half of the 1990s, a number of analysts speculated that the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland might reasonably expect EU membership by the end of the twentieth century, followed shortly thereafter by Slovenia and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

As the EU's largest and economically strongest state, united Germany assumed an enhanced role in discussions about liberalizing world trade. Although some signs had emerged in the early 1990s that cast doubt on a successful conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—see Glossary) negotiations, there were strong reasons to believe that Germany would use its influence to strengthen international trade and thwart any moves that could lead to transatlantic trade wars (see Foreign Trade and Investment, ch. 6).

When the EU's generous price supports of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP—see Glossary) came under heavy fire from the United States in the GATT negotiations, Germany and Britain—leading food importers—showed an inclination to accept cuts in EU subsidies. But when Paris resisted vehemently, officials in Washington had looked for a stronger German role, hoping Bonn would exert greater pressure on its neighbor to cut farm subsidies and thereby overcome an important stumbling block in the GATT talks.

Germany itself was locked in debate over the issue of agricultural policy. Germany's free-trade lobby was led by the classically liberal FDP, which traditionally had one of its members serve as minister for economics. Kohl had shown himself sympathetic to Germany's farm lobby, and the German government had traditionally been a strong defender of the CAP. The German economy's dependence on foreign trade and investment, however, often pushed the country toward pragmatism and compromise on trade issues. In the early 1990s, Germany was exporting a third of its GNP. In the United States alone, it held a stake of US$34 billion in direct investment.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), established in 1975, provided an organization whose structure helped join West Germany and other Western countries with the emerging democracies of the former Soviet bloc. The CSCE, renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995, gained expanded

responsibilities after the end of the Cold War. For Germany, an avid champion of the organization, the OSCE will provide a forum for greater inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact countries to discuss and coordinate security activities.

Although NATO officials insisted that the OSCE's role be restricted to a complementary one as concerned with the West's defense alliance, the foreign ministers of NATO member states had explicitly called for the OSCE to play a more prominent role in confidence-building and security cooperation. In September 1991, Genscher proposed a number of ideas for expanding the CSCE's capability and mandate. These proposals included creation of a security council and establishment of special forces for peacekeeping (blue helmets) and fighting of ecological disasters (green helmets). Germany actively pushed for the development of a conflict settlement procedure and for authorization for the OSCE to monitor the compliance of member states with human and minority rights standards. It would also use violations of member states as a legitimate condition for diplomatic intervention.

Germany's enthusiasm for the OSCE reflected the German preoccupation with multilateralism, a central theme in the country's foreign policy. The powerful emphasis on economic relations in the CSCE process also reflected the growing belief in Bonn that economic factors, rather than military capabilities, would be primary in shaping a new European and international security order. In this context, Bonn proposed and hosted the 1990 CSCE conference on economic cooperation in Europe. The Bonn CSCE document provided a framework for an integrated economic community based on market principles that would stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Support for the CSCE, German officials argued, did not conflict with their government's commitment to other European and transatlantic defense organizations. On the contrary, if appropriate steps were taken in the design of a post-Cold War security order, one would simply overlap, or neatly dovetail, with another. Moves toward mechanisms that would strengthen Europe's collective security intensified in the first years after the breach of the Berlin Wall.

As a consequence of the November 1990 Paris Charter and the July 1992 Helsinki Summit, efforts commenced to strengthen the CSCE process through the establishment (in different capitals) of a parliamentary assembly, a permanent secretariat, an election monitoring center, and a conflict pre-



Chancellor Helmut Kohl with President William J. Clinton at the White House
Courtesy The White House

vention center. Proponents championed the CSCE as the only pan-European forum for the discussion of security issues. From the beginning, however, skeptics warned of the limitations of an organization encompassing over fifty members—from Russia to Canada, and from Cyprus to the Vatican—whose decision-making capacity was governed by a prerequisite of unanimity among its members. CSCE members undertook the formidable and, in the view of many, unreasonable legal obligation "to provide mutual assistance in the case of an attack from the outside and the duty to submit to arbitration in the case of local conflicts."

The bickering and reservations over Maastricht—best symbolized by the defeat of the treaty in Denmark in the summer of 1992 and the victory by a narrow margin in France the following autumn—disrupted the carefully cultivated process of European economic and political unity, which had been supported on the continent, especially by policy makers in Germany and France. The paralysis of the CSCE, EU, and WEU in responding to the fighting in the Balkans in 1991 and 1992 also did much to dampen earlier optimism in Europe that the EU was on the verge of forging a framework for common foreign and defense policies.

United Nations

Since October 3, 1990, the day of German unification, the interests of Germans in the former FRG as well as those citizens in the former GDR have been represented by a single mission in the UN. Although German politicians repeatedly stated that the country was committed to assuming the same rights and responsibilities as other member states, Germany had remained undecided during the first years after unification as to what extent it would participate militarily—under Article 51 of the UN Charter—in collective security actions abroad.

Although Germany supported the policy pursued by the United States and its allies—condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, endorsement of the UN's peace initiatives, and the campaign to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory—the Germans did not join combat missions in Operation Desert Storm. Although German participation in a combat role was barred primarily by legal constraints, Germany's abstention was related to other deeper, more complex issues as well. Many Germans believed that an out-of-area conflict such as the Persian Gulf War lay beyond the scope of German interests. The support of Germany's parliament for the war was tepid and initially ambiguous. Germany's traumatic twentieth-century history figured prominently in Bonn's hesitation.

Under pressure from the United States and other allies, Germany agreed in the fall of 1990 initially to contribute US$2.1 billion, together with military equipment and munitions, to the gulf peacekeeping force. Ultimately, German financial contributions to the UN for the Persian Gulf War totaled about US$10 billion.

Nevertheless, Germany remains committed to the UN's use of military force. In his first address to the UN General Assembly on September 23, 1992, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinkel pledged that his country would support the UN's system of collective security. In his address, Kinkel stated that it was essential that "democracies . . . remain capable of defending themselves," even though the East-West conflict had been relegated to history. Kinkel maintained that the collective security system of the UN and regional arrangements such as the CSCE should be transformed into "powerful instruments of a new world domestic policy."

In the mid-1990s, German policy is that the country will continue to participate in peacekeeping missions. The German government continues to support the general outlines of UN

policies and programs on humanitarian relief, developmental assistance, and environmental protection. However, statesmen from United States president Bush to UN secretary general Javier Pérez de Cuellar (and later his successor Boutros Boutros-Ghali), have called for Germany to accept greater responsibility in world affairs by making use of not just its financial resources, but of its political and military capabilities as well.

Despite the fact that Germany has not yet resolved key questions about its international role, and specifically its contributions to peacemaking efforts, German politicians have already begun to suggest that the united country, presumably along with Japan, be considered for permanent membership on the UN Security Council. One school argues that a permanent seat is consistent with Germany's growing power and influence and the reconfiguration of world politics five decades after the end of World War II. Others contend that Germany's attainment of a permanent seat will occur only if states from Asia, Latin America, and Africa join as well. Because such expansion would have the effect of weakening the leadership role of the Security Council and thus the UN as a whole, many of these commentators reject the idea of permanent Security Council membership for Germany.

* * *

Since 1990 there have been a number of excellent publications on the process of unification and the emerging challenges to Germany's foreign policy. Among the best are *Germany's Position in the New Europe,* edited by Arnulf Baring; *The New Germany and the New Europe,* edited by Paul B. Stares; and *Developments in German Politics,* edited by Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl, and Stephen Padget. Also valuable is *Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik,* edited by Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull. Stephen F. Szabo's concise *The Diplomacy of German Unification* provides examinations of the unification process. Authoritative fuller accounts of unification are *Beyond the Wall* by Elizabeth Pond and *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice.

For an analysis of public opinion data from united Germany, see the Rand Corporation's study conducted by Ronald A. Asmus, *Germany in Transition.* On United States-German relations, see W.R. Smyser's *Germany and America.* Also valuable is Daniel Hamilton's *Beyond Bonn,* which offers a critical survey of

issues relating directly to United States-German bilateral relations. For an examination of Franco-German relations, see Philip H. Gordon's *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance. The Germans and Their Neighbors,* edited by Dirk Verheyen and Christian Søe, provides chapter-length surveys of Germany's bilateral relations with nearly a score of European countries and with the United States.

A number of articles also offer excellent overviews of German foreign policy: Angela Stent's "The One Germany," Elizabeth Pond's "Germany in the New Europe," and Reinhard Stuth's "Germany's New Role in a Changing Europe." Two essays published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University bear particular note as well: Burkhard Koch's *Germany: New Assertiveness in International Relations Between Reality and Misperception,* and L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan's *Germany: Key to a New Continent.*

The German Information Center in New York makes available weekly press summaries and important statements and speeches by German government officials. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Report: West Europe* also provides useful information in translation from sources published or broadcast in Germany. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 9. National Security

Seal of the Federal Republic of Germany

THE FEDERAL ARMED FORCES (Bundeswehr) of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) came into being in 1955. Assigned a solely defensive role, the Bundeswehr at its creation constituted the largest component of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary) ground forces in Central Europe. Throughout the Cold War, the fighter aircraft and air defense missiles of the Bundeswehr's formidable air force came under NATO command, and the small, well-equipped West German navy was committed to NATO missions in the Baltic and North seas. NATO carefully delineated the Bundeswehr's missions; in effect, West German security objectives were identical with those of the Alliance.

By mid-1995, however, the Bundeswehr, numbering approximately 368,000 troops, had been through a radical restructuring and downsizing brought about by the sudden end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) and the Soviet empire. After Germany was united in October 1990 by the accession of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) to the Federal Republic, the Bundeswehr absorbed some of the personnel and equipment of the East German armed forces, the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee—NVA), in a unique merger of two formerly hostile militaries that had been unimaginable even one year earlier.

Prior to unification, the armed forces of East and West Germany were considered among the shock troops of their respective alliances. The leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact— the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively—each maintained powerful forces based in the two Germanys, the presumed battleground. In terms of tactics, force organization and structure, and equipment, superpower influence on each German military was pervasive. On the Soviet side, with more than 400,000 troops, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) was far larger than the NVA itself and was the Warsaw Pact's most potent military force outside the Soviet Union. The United States was clearly the most important member of NATO, but only a small portion of its total military forces were stationed in West Germany or in Europe. Unification changed the Bundeswehr's situation dramatically and in the process

added about 30 percent more territory and hundreds of kilometers of Baltic Sea coastline to the task of preserving the territorial integrity of the enlarged country.

Paving the way for unification and restoration of full sovereignty, an agreement with Moscow in July 1990 committed Germany to reducing its armed forces to a level of 370,000 by December 1994 in return for the complete withdrawal of all troops of the former Soviet Union in eastern Germany by the end of that year. Initial Soviet objections to unified Germany's membership in NATO were dropped when Germany agreed to finance the relocation and housing of the departing troops. Under the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty—see Glossary), Germany also undertook to make massive cuts in its weapons inventory. But even after these reductions, the Federal Republic would still possess the largest European forces in NATO.

Since World War II, the prospect of an independent German military had been a source of anxiety both within West Germany and among its former foes and neighbors. In addition, German irredentist claims had led to war in the past. So it was only after Germany publicly and officially recognized the validity of its existing borders that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union consented to the idea of German unification.

Traditional German militarism has been tempered in the Bundeswehr, which remains a part of society rather than a society unto itself. The officer corps has not become an elite, as it had previously. Every member of the armed forces retains individual rights as a citizen and enjoys liberties unavailable to United States troops, such as the right to join a union or run for public office while in the service. In the Bundeswehr, sexual orientation has not been a contentious issue. Female citizens of the Federal Republic interested in a military career are, however, restricted to service in the medical and musical corps.

Although a powerful peace movement uniting environmentalists, students, trade unionists, and religious leaders articulated pacifist and antimilitarist positions with some success in the postwar period, the armed forces continues to be staffed largely by conscription. About 40 percent of the troops are draftees; the remainder are regulars or extended-service volunteers. In 1972 the term of service was reduced from eighteen months to fifteen months; in 1990 it was further reduced to twelve months; beginning in 1996, it will fall to ten months. Thousands of young men have been exempted or had their

service deferred for educational, health, or hardship reasons. A growing number of young men (60,000 of 200,000 called) are granted conscientious objector status. These men perform alternative service (*Ersatzdienst*) in hospitals or homes for senior citizens or for people with disabilities. Those aspiring to become officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are required to enter as conscripts before volunteering for longer enlistments. Only the most qualified are permitted to undergo the rigorous preparation for a full career in the armed services.

Because the West German armed forces had been so subordinated to NATO—an alliance in search of a new identity and mission in the 1990s—the Bundeswehr of united Germany has experienced difficulty in defining its missions and justifying the need for a large and costly military establishment. Until July 1994, Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, had been interpreted as prohibiting the deployment of German forces outside the NATO area in United Nations (UN) or other international peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. Consequently, despite pressure from some allies, no German troops were included in the UN coalition that fought Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Instead, Germany made financial contributions to the action, and some German units were deployed to Turkey as a defensive measure. German soldiers joined humanitarian operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, but the opposition Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—SPD) strenuously opposed involvement that could bring German forces into combat. In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court, the highest court in the land, ruled that the Bundeswehr could participate in international military operations if each deployment received approval in the Bundestag, the lower house of Germany's parliament.

In unified Germany, the maintenance of internal security is for the most part the responsibility of the individual police forces of the sixteen states (*Länder;* sing., *Land*), controlled by the individual ministries of interior of the *Länder.* This decentralized system has its roots in the post-1871 German Empire. The Western Allies after World War II insisted on a return to the *Land* system because of abuses by Hitler's highly centralized police forces during the Nazi era (1933–45). To an increasing extent, *Land* police activities are coordinated and supported by the federal Ministry of Interior, which has its own criminal police agency and domestic intelligence services. The paramili-

tary border police is available as a uniformed federal backup force in the event of major disorders.

In the early 1990s, controversy and scandal erupted over the opening of the records of the former East German State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst—Stasi). Former dissidents and political figures were discredited by revelations of dealings with the Stasi, whose repressive influence had permeated most aspects of life in the former GDR. As a result, police forces of the five new *Länder* underwent restructuring and retraining to bring them up to the level of competency of Western police forces.

Beginning in the late 1960s, the danger of violence by terrorist groups has been a chronic problem for the police. After unification in 1990, the principal threat to public order shifted from left-wing extremists to right-wing and neo-Nazi groups that targeted the growing numbers of asylum-seekers, as well as the millions of foreign workers, many of whom had been employed in Germany for decades. Federal authorities responded to criticism that law enforcement agencies and courts were lax in dealing with right-wing violence by strengthening federal-*Land* cooperation and acting more aggressively to curb extremist incidents.

In the 1990s, Germany's security forces are experiencing their share of the confusion and disarray brought about by the hastily executed process of unification. For nearly half a century, two radically different societies had evolved in the two Germanys. In the east, under Soviet occupation, an aggressive campaign of early indoctrination and militarization was introduced. Overlapping premilitary and paramilitary organizations perpetuated antagonism toward NATO, West Germany, the United States, and the free-market system. Initiative was stifled, and obedience was demanded. When the communist system collapsed, the superstructure upon which it relied (armed forces, police, and border guards) was discredited. Meanwhile, in the West, support for NATO and the United States troop presence fell as the threat diminished, and growing numbers of German youth opted for alternative service.

Military Tradition

Early History

The first Germans to win repute as fearsome adversaries in combat were members of the various tribes who fought the

encroachment of Roman legions upon their territories. The Roman historian Tacitus praised the leadership and military acumen of Arminius, a chief of the Cherusci who commanded the German forces in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in A.D. 9. The tribal warriors led by Arminius annihilated three Roman legions, effectively preventing Roman expansion beyond the Danube and Rhine rivers. By the fifth century, German tribes had entered the Italian peninsula and brought about the collapse of the Roman Empire in the west.

The empire created by Charlemagne (r. 768–814) in west-central Europe split up soon after his death, the eastern portion occupying much of the territory of modern Germany. These German lands gradually evolved into the Holy Roman Empire, with extensive territories in Italy (see Medieval Germany, ch. 1). Many of the German kingdoms, principalities, and cities that were components of the empire were noted for the emphasis their leaders placed on military might. However, no imperial army or law held sway over the local princes and free cities. The absence of a strong central power, plus the emergence of Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, resulted in a near-permanent state of civil conflict, wars of succession, and religious strife (see The Protestant Reformation, ch. 1). The Thirty Years' War (1618–48), a series of conflicts between Protestant and Catholic forces, decimated Germany's population (see The Thirty Years' War, ch. 1).

Prussia's Emergence as a Military Power

After the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia eventually emerged as the dominant power in central Europe (see The Age of Enlightened Absolutism, 1648–1789, ch. 1). Prussia had been colonized and Germanized during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the Knights of the Teutonic Order, a military order of German monks that pushed back or overran the Slavs in the area. The knights were crushed by the Poles and Lithuanians in 1410 at the Battle of Tannenberg, but in the next century the Hohenzollern Dynasty that ruled Brandenburg and made Berlin its residence was able to win control over West Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, and eventually much of the Rhineland and Westphalia.

The German military heritage was epitomized by a succession of Prussian rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The first of these was the Great Elector, Frederick William (r. 1640–88), who recognized that a standing army

with an elite officer corps was the key to the development of a powerful state in his remote part of the empire. His grandson, Frederick William I (r. 1713–40), more than doubled the size of his professional army to 90,000 and added a trained reserve of conscripted peasants, forming one of the most modern and efficient fighting units in eighteenth-century Europe. Heavy taxes supported the army, which consumed 80 percent of state revenues even in peacetime. The next Prussian king, Frederick II (r. 1740–86), known to posterity as Frederick the Great, raised the strength of the army to 150,000 and launched a series of wars between 1740 and 1763, wresting control of the province of Silesia from Habsburg Austria. Prussia had become one of the most powerful continental states and a contender with the Habsburgs for domination over the myriad German political entities.

The aristocratic character of the officer corps was established early in the eighteenth century as Prussian kings tried to gain the support of wealthy landed aristocrats, known as Junkers, by granting them a virtual monopoly over the selection of officers. In 1733 a cadet school was established in Berlin to train sons of Junkers to be officers. The officer corps was well on the way to becoming the most privileged social class in Prussia.

The chauvinistic militarism of Prussia inspired fear and hatred among other European states and peoples. Under the strong leadership of a self-perpetuating general staff, the army brooked little interference in its affairs by the civil government. Nevertheless, the failure to reform and the lack of preparedness after the death of Frederick the Great in 1786 led to the army's decisive defeat by Napoleon's forces at Jena in October 1806.

Over the next few years, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst guided the revitalization of the army. Reforms included the introduction of universal military service and an end to dependence on mercenaries. The officer corps was expanded to include commoners, and officers were encouraged to take greater initiative in battle. The new Prussian army distinguished itself at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 and again at Waterloo in 1815, where, under the command of Field Marshal Gebhard von Blücher, the army was instrumental in the ultimate defeat of Napoleon.

Prussia's reputation for military efficiency was reestablished by the army's final victories over Napoleon. The Prussian War

College (Kriegsakademie) became a model for military staff colleges around the world in the early nineteenth century. A book of that era—*On War*—written by Karl von Clausewitz, a Prussian general, became a classic, its theories of land warfare still studied by officers of many armies more than 160 years after the author's death.

The unification of the many German states into the German Empire (1871–1918) followed Prussian-led victories over Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870–71. Prussia's aggressive policies were masterminded by Otto von Bismarck, who became united Germany's first chancellor (see Bismarck and Unification, ch. 1). Following unification, the legendary Prussian General Staff became the German General Staff. Clausewitz's dictum that civilians should control the military was ignored, and the General Staff became a power center in the highly militaristic regimes of Kaiser Wilhelm I (1858–88) and Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888–1918) (see Imperial Germany, ch. 1).

The German Military in Two World Wars

Prussian-German excellence in military matters was an accepted fact of life, but in the twentieth century the excessive accent on militarism led to two disastrous world wars. Germany's insistence on building a fleet that could challenge Britain's naval domination underscored German bellicosity and pushed Britain toward alignment with France and Russia. When World War I broke out in 1914, Germany attempted to conquer France quickly with a sudden thrust through Belgium. The Germans nearly reached Paris, but the desperate French managed to stiffen their defenses along the Marne River. The front was stabilized in northern France and shifted little during the course of the war in spite of the sacrifice of whole armies in the effort to break through opposing defenses. Although Germany was able to force Russia out of the war in March 1918, the arrival of fresh United States troops, strikes and protests among German workers, and the exhaustion of material resources brought about Germany's collapse in November 1918. General Erich Ludendorff and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg formed what was in effect a military dictatorship in 1917 but sidestepped responsibility for the military catastrophe by restoring civilian control in the chaos of 1918. They then falsely claimed that the military, undefeated in the field, had been

"stabbed in the back" by domestic enemies, a charge that Adolf Hitler employed later to great effect.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the German General Staff was abolished. The army was limited to 100,000 personnel and the navy to a force of 15,000. Aircraft, tanks, submarines, and other offensive weapons were prohibited. The left bank of the Rhine was demilitarized. The Allies intended that the civilian government of the postwar Weimar Republic (1918–33) completely control the military and that the destruction of the General Staff epitomize the end of Prussianism. Nevertheless, a general staff continued to function under the sobriquet "Troop Office," and its leaders took advantage of the weak civilian government to reassert their privileged positions. When Hindenburg was elected president of the republic in 1925, the general staff officers regained their influence in the government (see The Weimar Republic, 1918–33, ch. 1).

During the 1920s, a clandestine alliance was formed between the armies of the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union to circumvent the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The German high command under General Hans von Seeckt made secret arrangements with the Soviet high command enabling German officers and specialists to study and train with modern weapons in the Soviet Union in return for German technical assistance in the establishment of Soviet defense industries. This collaboration helped keep alive the military know-how used later as the basis of Hitler's war machine.

By September 1939, when Hitler's invasion of Poland triggered World War II, Germany had a formidable army, a potent navy, and the best equipped air force in the world. The blitzkrieg (lightning war), in which highly mobile, tank-heavy land armies were deployed in conjunction with large numbers of close-support aircraft, included tactics never before seen in warfare. In the spring of 1940, the German army, the Wehrmacht, defeated Denmark and Norway, outflanked French defenses along the Maginot Line, destroyed the armies of France and Belgium, and forced the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Forces at Dunkirk—all in a little over a month.

The rapid victories of the early war period did not lead to peace, however. France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Poland were occupied, but the staunch resistance of Britain's Royal Air Force deterred Hitler's planned invasion of Britain. The war took on a global character in 1941, with the Wehrmacht's invasion of its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, in

June and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor the following December, which drew the United States into the conflict. Even though the redoubtable Nazi war machine fought on for almost four more years, the resources and manpower that the Allies could invest eventually sealed the fate of Hitler's vaunted "Thousand-Year Reich."

Once the Soviet forces were able to turn the tide in their favor on the Eastern Front and the Western Allies established themselves in France, there could no longer be any doubt about the outcome of the war. Nevertheless, Hitler refused to seek peace. The inevitable result was the destruction not only of the country's armed forces but also of its towns and cities, its industrial capacity, and its transportation system. Despite this second catastrophic defeat in fewer than thirty years, the German reputation for military excellence survived. The defeats could be attributed to strategic blunders, two-front wars, and madness and depravity among the Nazi leadership.

The Allies demanded and received Nazi Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945. Two months later, at a summit conference held at Potsdam, near Berlin, the leaders of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union decreed, inter alia, the demilitarization of Germany. Although the Allies disagreed on many issues discussed at Potsdam, they were in accord on the need to prevent a resurgence of German militarism; toward that end, they ordered total disarmament. In the immediate postwar years, however, the Allies could not agree on the terms of a peace treaty, and before long they were aligning on opposite sides of the Cold War. By 1949 the British, French, and United States zones of occupation had become West Germany, and the Soviet zone had become East Germany. The border between the two republics became the front line of the Cold War, or, in the term popularized by Winston Churchill, the Iron Curtain. Soon, uniformed Germans carrying weapons were appearing on both sides of the border (see Postwar Occupation and Division, ch. 2).

Creation of the Bundeswehr

In the summer of 1955, ten years after the Nazi surrender and the end of World War II, the West German Bundestag (lower house of parliament) voted to authorize the recruitment of volunteers for the initial formation of the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces). Later in the year, a cadre of about 100 officers and NCOs were sworn in at a ceremony in Bonn. Most

of the initial volunteers were veterans of the World War II Wehrmacht who had been serving in the Federal Border Force (Bundesgrenzschutz—BGS) since the inception of that lightly armed organization in 1951 (see Federal Police Agencies, this ch.).

Training facilities and equipment were made available by the United States Army, and 1,500 volunteers reported for the first training cycle, which began in January 1956. The Bundestag soon promulgated compulsory military service. By the end of the year, the force numbered about 65,000, including 10,000 volunteers from the BGS, almost all of whom were war veterans. The reappearance of a German armed force, which would have been inconceivable a decade earlier, had become a reality as a direct result of the Cold War.

The London and Paris agreements of 1954 restored sovereignty to the Federal Republic and opened the way for German membership in NATO. The four Allies retained occupation powers in Berlin. Allied troops remained in West Germany for purposes of NATO defense pursuant to status-of-forces agreements. With the exception of French troops, Allied and German forces were under NATO's joint defense command.

In East Germany, the national legislature passed a bill establishing the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense in January 1956. The swift creation of an East German armed forces, the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee—NVA), more than 120,000 personnel practicing Prussian-style drill, was a dramatic gesture of nationalism impossible for the world to ignore. Thus, the 1950s saw both Germanys embark upon the reestablishment of their military forces, albeit ones firmly restrained within the mutually antagonistic Cold War alliances.

Strategic Concerns and Military Missions

Until the late 1980s, the Federal Republic was confronted by a single preponderant threat arising from the forward deployment of armored and highly maneuverable Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. The threat to NATO and to Germany abated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the phased withdrawal during the first half of the 1990s of Soviet (and, later, Russian) units from the former East Germany and from other Warsaw Pact nations.

Instead of having to prepare for the contingency of direct attack from the east, a united Germany faces more diffuse and intangible security problems. Under the new conditions, Ger-

Two soldiers during an exercise
A Leopard–2 main battle tank
Courtesy Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington

many's concerns focus on the possibility of armed conflicts arising in any one of three regions. The first is in the former Soviet Union, where fifteen former Soviet republics, several of them with powerful conventional forces and even nuclear capabilities, are undergoing a difficult transition to independent nationhood. Second, in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of communist rule and the problems of the fragile democratic systems that followed have also created the potential for dangerous upheaval. Historical animosities previously suppressed under an authoritarian regime have already brought civil war to the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic or religious violence could easily break out elsewhere in the region, producing destabilizing conditions, including the arrival of waves of refugees. Finally, German military planners also foresee possible conflict in the volatile area extending from the southern rim of the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. In this region, the emergence of fundamentalist or radical regimes poses a potential threat to NATO member states such as Turkey, which could lead to a call for German force deployments.

The primary mission of the German armed forces remains the protection of German territory in conjunction with other NATO armies. This task would fall to NATO's main defense forces, which, under guidelines adopted in 1991, will constitute the bulk of NATO forces in Central Europe. The main defense forces will consist of four multinational corps, only partially mobilized in peacetime. Two corps will be under German command, and German divisions will also be assigned to the remaining corps commands. NATO's Rapid Reaction Force will be available to assume regional crisis management and to take limited action in either Central Europe or elsewhere in the NATO area. The force will also provide protection during the buildup of the main defense forces. Germany's contribution to the Rapid Reaction Force will include its operationally ready combat brigades. The air component of the Rapid Reaction Force will include twenty aircraft squadrons under the command of a German officer.

In addition to maintaining NATO-committed combat units, the evolving Bundeswehr will retain support forces to provide military infrastructure and logistics, training units and schools, medical services, and non-NATO air defense. It will be required to have contingents ready to conduct peacetime missions of disaster relief, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance. German commanders also must plan for possible

deployments in support of out-of-area NATO or UN operations (see International Military Missions, this ch.; The Out-of-Area Debate, ch. 8).

The Armed Forces

Command and Control

Under the Basic Law, the federal minister of defense commands the Bundeswehr in peacetime, but that official relinquishes this role to the federal chancellor in the event of a "state of defense," that is, an outbreak of hostilities. The Ministry of Defense is traditionally headed by a civilian and assisted by two parliamentary state secretaries and two state secretaries. There are six nonmilitary divisions staffed primarily by civilians—personnel; budget; administrative and legal affairs; quartermaster, real estate, and construction; social services; and armaments. The military side of the ministry is composed of five military staffs—the armed forces office, army, navy, air force, and surgeon general (see fig. 14).

The top military position is that of *General Inspekteur* of the armed forces, an individual who is roughly equivalent to the United States chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The *General Inspekteur* is the supreme military representative of the Bundeswehr and military adviser to the minister of defense. The *General Inspekteur*'s planning responsibilities require him to develop overall concepts governing the structure, organization, command and control, equipment, and training of the Bundeswehr. The *General Inspekteur* also represents the Bundeswehr in international bodies. However, he is not part of the chain of operational command between the minister and the chief of staff ("inspector") of each branch of the armed forces.

The Bundeswehr has no general staff. Because of its tainted history and condemnation at the Nuremberg trials, that particular structure was omitted when the Bundeswehr was being planned. Non-NATO joint planning is conducted by representatives from the Bundeswehr and the service general staffs under the overall supervision of the Bundeswehr's Operations Directorate. The staffs of the army, air force, and navy are responsible for the operational readiness of their respective force components. They are involved in the coordination and approval processes of NATO plans for the defense of German territory but do not undertake operational wartime planning.

Because Germany will relinquish operational command over its combat units—together with certain formations of its territorial army—in the event of war, there is little requirement for independent German war plans.

In passing the annual budget law, the Bundestag determines the number of military and civil personnel to be employed in the defense sector, sets out the basic features of the Bundeswehr organization, and authorizes the financing of specific sums for defense. Parliament also decides other important aspects of defense policy, such as the duration of conscription. Before forces can be committed to military action, parliament must determine in accordance with Article 80a of the Basic Law that a state of tension exists or in accordance with Article 115a that a state of defense exists. If parliament cannot be convened on time, the twenty-two-member Joint Committee, with the president of the Bundestag presiding, acts on its behalf.

Many Bundestag committees also exercise some controlling functions over the Bundeswehr. The twenty-seven-member Defense Committee focuses on defense and security policy but can also function as an investigating committee.

Army

In early 1995, the army (Bundesheer), headquartered in Koblenz, had a personnel strength of appropriately 255,000, including 123,000 conscripts. It was composed of two principal elements, the field army and the much smaller territorial army. Territorial army units were slated to be merged with the field army by the end of 1995. The field army is listed in *The Military Balance, 1994–1995* as consisting of three corps and eight divisions (four armored divisions, three armored infantry divisions, and one mountain division).

A radical reshaping of the army was completed by the end of 1994, in which the Bundeswehr was adapted to the diminishing threat in Central Europe, the recasting of NATO's force structure, and Germany's 1990 commitments to reduce its force level and armaments. These commitments were embodied in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, or, as it is more commonly known, the Two-Plus-Four Treaty signed in September 1990 and the CFE Treaty signed that November. According to these commitments, manpower had to be reduced so that all services could meet the CFE ceiling of 370,000 by December 1994, with a sublimit of 345,000 for the army and air force. Naval forces also had to be cut, although



Figure 14. Organization of the Ministry of Defense, 1995

they were not included in the CFE Treaty except for land-based marines (of which Germany has none) and naval air units.

The treaty obligations were met successfully, and in early 1995 the Bundesheer amounted to about 255,000 soldiers, of whom about 123,000 were conscripts. The army consists of three corps, under the overall direction of the Army Forces Command. The headquarters of I Corps is in Münster, that of II Corps in Ulm, and that of IV Corps in Potsdam. Only IV Corps is solely German. The other two are joint corps: I Corps is German-Dutch; II Corps is German-United States. Under the corps commands are seven divisions in place of the previous twelve, and twenty-four combat brigades instead of the previous forty-eight. Six of the divisions are committed to NATO's main defense force, but the two divisions of IV Corps in the east remain under German national command. Under the operational command of II Corps is the Eurocorps, scheduled to be operational in late 1995 with 50,000 troops. Lastly, there is the Air-Mobile Forces Command, which commands crisis-reaction forces.

The army's twenty-four combat brigades include sixteen mechanized brigades, three airborne brigades, one mountain brigade, and the German component of the Franco-German Brigade. Only six brigades are maintained at full strength—two airborne brigades, three mechanized brigades, and the mountain brigade. Some of these ready brigades are committed to the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. All of the active units are staffed with a high proportion of regulars. The remaining brigades are staffed at about a 60 percent level in peacetime, mainly with conscripts. In each brigade, one armored battalion and one infantry battalion are filled out by drawing cadres from staffed units when expanded to full strength. Tanks and other armored vehicles of the cadre units are stored, as are 25 percent of the vehicles of active battalions.

According to Ministry of Defense plans, the Bundesheer will become even smaller in the second half of the 1990s. By the year 2000, the army is to consist of about 233,000 personnel, of which 37,000 will be assigned to rapid-reaction units. The army will eliminate one division headquarters and two brigade headquarters. To meet NATO obligations, the 14th Division headquarters in Neubrandenburg will assume the mission of the 6th Division, which is to be disbanded. This move will integrate a division in the new *Länder* into the NATO military structure for the first time.

Equipment

With the absorption of equipment from the NVA in 1990, the Bundesheer had more than 7,000 main battle tanks, most of them highly regarded German-built Leopards plus nearly 2,300 Soviet models. It had 3,250 armored infantry fighting vehicles, of which about two-thirds were German Marder A1/A2 models and the remainder Soviet BMPs. The Bundesheer's inventory listed 11,000 armored personnel carriers, including a large number of Soviet vehicles inherited from the NVA.

As of 1995, Germany had kept little of the weaponry of the former NVA, giving away many spare parts, destroying huge caches of weapons and ammunition, and selling surplus equipment. East German tanks had been shipped to Finland, and warships had been sold to Paraguay and Indonesia.

In line with its CFE commitments, Germany reduced its inventory of main battle tanks to 2,855, its armored infantry fighting vehicles to 2,443 units, and its artillery to 2,090 pieces (see table 23, Appendix). This represented the highest rate of disarmament among the CFE signatories, with the exception of Russia.

In accordance with several international commitments, no nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are in the German arms inventory. Under the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, Germany reaffirmed its renunciation of the manufacture, possession, and control of such weapons. A number of German weapons systems are nuclear-capable, but nuclear warheads and bombs remain under the control of the United States. Some Tornado aircraft have been fitted to accept nuclear bombs.

Franco-German Brigade and Eurocorps

In 1987 German chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president François Mitterrand agreed on the formation of a Franco-German Brigade to be stationed in southwest Germany, but with headquarters in Strasbourg, France. Once established, the French and German units in the brigade were not integrated; the brigade functioned jointly only at the command, secretariat, and logistic levels. The German contribution consisted of one mechanized infantry battalion, one artillery battalion, and one self-propelled antitank company. Troops are attired in the uniforms of their own armies but wear a distinctive blue beret bearing the insignia of both armies.

In May 1992, Kohl and Mitterrand announced the establishment of a Eurocorps intended to form the nucleus of a Euro-

pean army. All the states of the Western European Union (WEU—see Glossary) were invited to participate. Three possible missions were identified: deployment under NATO control in time of war; peacemaking and peacekeeping operations under WEU command in places outside the NATO treaty area, subject to constitutional limits on German troop deployments; and employment for humanitarian purposes abroad.

The Eurocorps is scheduled to be operational by October 1995 and to number about 50,000 troops, including a French armored division, a German division, a Belgian mechanized division, and a Spanish mechanized infantry brigade. The German division, the 10th Armored, will remain simultaneously committed to NATO. The troops will be stationed on German soil and will retain their separate national identities under a joint command at Strasbourg. Before the Eurocorps can be deployed, every government that has contributed troops will have to approve the mission.

Navy

The primary areas of operation of the navy (Bundesmarine) in the event of war are the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. Until 1990 the navy's mission had been to block the Baltic approaches on behalf of NATO to prevent the deployment of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The navy also contributed to protection of NATO sea routes by helping to control the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea. Although lacking large surface units, the navy was well equipped to carry out intelligence and reconnaissance, mine countermeasure operations, and antisubmarine and antiship warfare. The navy regularly participated in NATO exercises as part of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and Standing Naval Force Channel.

The political changes that unfolded in 1990 enabled the navy to reduce its concentration on the Baltic Sea and northern flank, shifting from defending against a tangible Warsaw Pact threat to preparing for a broader spectrum of maritime defense missions and tasks beyond home waters. The deployment of mine countermeasure vessels to the Mediterranean for NATO during the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990 and to the Persian Gulf after hostilities broke out in 1991, as well as Germany's participation in monitoring the naval blockade against Serbia in 1992, undoubtedly foreshadow other possible requirements distant from German coastal waters.

Although the navy is preparing for possible involvement in future multilateral and humanitarian missions, its primary task will continue to be to prevent attacking forces from controlling German territorial and adjacent waters. The nations of the former Soviet Union are no longer regarded as hostile; however, the presence of Russian naval units in the Baltic, with their potential to deny Germany the use of its territorial waters and the high seas, remains a relevant factor in strategic planning.

As of early 1995, the navy had about 30,000 personnel, including 4,230 Naval Air Arm personnel, and 6,700 conscripts. The ship inventory included as its principal combat units twenty submarines, thirteen destroyers and frigates, and thirty-eight missile craft (see table 24, Appendix). The Naval Air Arm is equipped with Tornado fighter-ground attack aircraft and Breguet Atlantic aircraft fitted for long-range reconnaissance, including some dedicated to electronic intelligence. Dornier Do–28s are used for short-range surveillance and patrol of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Two Westland Sea Lynx helicopters are based on each frigate for antisubmarine warfare and target acquisition.

Four Brandenburg-class frigates are under construction to replace Hamburg-class vessels by the end of 1996. Four Type 212 submarines are scheduled to be introduced after 2000 to begin the replacement of Type 205 and unmodernized Type 206 submarines.

At unification the East German navy had a substantial fleet of twenty-three frigates, fifty-two missile boats, and twenty-four mine warfare vessels. Because the West German navy was already facing a sharp reduction, all East German ships were scheduled to be scrapped or sold, rather than absorbed within the unified navy.

Proportionately, the cuts imposed on the navy in response to the improved security situation in Europe have been the greatest among the three services. The ship inventory will be reduced to nearly half by the year 2005. The future German fleet will consist of about ninety vessels, including fifteen frigates, eight submarines, fifteen corvette patrol vessels, and twenty mine countermeasure ships. Personnel strength will decline to about 27,000 by 2000.

Under the chief of staff of the navy are three major commands: the Fleet Command at Glücksburg on the Baltic Sea; the Naval Office at Rostock, responsible for enlisted personnel,

A frigate of the Bremen class
Courtesy Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington

Sailors in winter uniform
Courtesy Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington

schools, armament, and the medical service; and the Naval Logistics Command at Wilhelmshaven. Under the consolidation plans, a number of bases will be closed and headquarters merged, leaving four main bases: Wilhelmshaven (frigates plus support vessels); Kiel (frigates, submarines, and support vessels); Olpenitz (mine countermeasure vessels); and Warnemünde (patrol boats). The naval air combat arm will be reduced from four to three wings of about forty-six Tornados based at Eggebek (near the Danish border), mainly for reconnaissance and attack sorties. The naval air station at Jagel and the remaining Tornados will be assigned to the air force.

Air Force

The air force (Luftwaffe) has faced dramatic changes in structure and strategic concepts as a result of the diminished threat in Central Europe and shrinking budgetary resources for modernized weapons systems. Prior to the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the air force had as its primary mission the air defense of Central Europe in conjunction with other NATO air forces. This included reconnaissance to forestall surprise attack, interdiction of enemy ground and air forces, prevention of enemy aircraft from reaching strategic targets, protection of friendly forces against air attack, and close battlefield support for NATO ground troops. The new security environment in Europe has brought a change in tasks for the Luftwaffe. With the absorption of the former East Germany, the national airspace that had to be patrolled increased substantially. With a major confrontation in Central Europe now only a slight possibility, the Luftwaffe has had to adjust its missions to take account of the possibility of involvement in conflict beyond the borders of Europe and in unstable regions within Europe.

As of early 1995, the Luftwaffe had a personnel strength of 83,000, including 25,000 conscripts. The principal combat units were eight squadrons of fighter-ground attack aircraft, equipped with Tornado fighter-ground attack aircraft. There were seven fighter squadrons, six with F–4Fs and one with MiG–29s (see table 25, Appendix). Developed as a joint effort by Britain, Italy, and West Germany, the Tornado is a high-speed, low-altitude, all-weather attack aircraft. The McDonnell Douglas F–4F Phantom, introduced in the United States in the 1960s, is still regarded as an outstanding fighter and attack aircraft of exceptional versatility. However, it is scheduled to be

replaced by a new combat aircraft in the late 1990s, the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA).

Ground-based air defense consisted of six groups, each with six squadrons, equipped with Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers; six groups, each with six squadrons, equipped with Hawk launchers; and fourteen squadrons equipped with Roland launchers for point defense. The German air defense units covering Central Europe and the Baltic approaches were fully operational, subject to control by NATO's integrated air-defense system even during peacetime.

By 1998 two squadrons of Tornado fighter-bombers are scheduled to be transferred from the navy to the air force, along with 800 naval personnel, as part of the plan to transform the naval air base at Jagel on the Baltic Sea into a Luftwaffe base. Of all the equipment taken over from the East German air force, only one squadron of MiG–29 fighter aircraft was absorbed by the Luftwaffe.

The ranking uniformed member of the Luftwaffe is the air force chief of staff, with headquarters in Cologne. Also at Cologne is the Combat Command, subdivided into the Southern Tactical Command and Northern Tactical Command. The Southern Tactical Command is collocated with NATO Combined Air Operations Center at Messstellen in the southwestern corner of Germany; the Northern Tactical Command is at Kalkar near the Dutch border. The Transport Command at Münster also comes under the Combat Command, as does the Communications and Electronic Command. The Air Force Office in Cologne is responsible for personnel, training, communications, and armaments. The Air Force Logistics Command, also in Cologne, is responsible for logistic units, training installations, and matériel.

Training

The basic objective of Bundeswehr training is to impart the technical knowledge necessary for mastery of advanced weaponry while instilling the discipline required in combat situations. Educational opportunities offered to service personnel vary with the length of enlistment and are intended to produce combat readiness while, to the extent possible, providing skills that will ease the eventual transition to civilian life. The Bundeswehr operates more than forty schools in addition to thirty-three apprentice workshops and ten nursing schools at station hospitals.

Basic and small-unit training are scheduled on a continuing basis. For conscripts, the entire period of service is devoted to one kind of training or another, but conscripts are not eligible for attendance at advanced service schools unless they voluntarily extend their term of service. After an introductory assignment to basic training regiments, air force conscripts prepare for their special tasks in on-the-job training. Because the Luftwaffe wishes to attract a higher proportion of longer-term personnel, it offers temporary career training and regular officer advanced training at air force extension schools, as well as at training facilities of the other services and other Allied forces. In the navy, sailors prepare for their duties at schools ashore before being assigned to ships for more on-the-job training. Volunteers receive advanced training at various schools offering courses in supply, engineering, radar, weapons, and other specialties. In both the air force and the navy, training culminates in national operational exercises and large-scale NATO exercises.

About 2,000 pilots and missile personnel of the air force and navy are trained in the United States under long-standing agreements between the German and United States governments. Primary pilot training is conducted at Sheppard Air Force Base in Texas on Beech Bonanzas, followed by jet training on T–37Bs and T–38As. A Tornado squadron is based at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico for advanced weapons training. German personnel attend the Patriot and Hawk missile school at Fort Bliss, Texas, and navigator training at Randolph Air Force Base near San Antonio. Helicopter training is conducted at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Much training is conducted jointly with service personnel of other NATO countries. Joint courses include forward air controller training at Fürstenfeldbruck Air Force Base, training at the army engineer school in Munich, and NATO logistics courses at the Bundeswehr Logistics School in Hamburg. German and other NATO pilots train in low-level flight techniques in Canada at Goose Bay, Labrador. German troops are shuttled to the Canadian province of Manitoba for armored infantry training on German equipment permanently maintained there.

The basic qualification for voluntary enlistment in the Bundeswehr is completion of five years at the secondary school (*Hauptschule*) level (see The Education System, ch. 4). Those with a university or technical college admission certificate can



A Tornado fighter-bomber
A submarine of the 206A class
Courtesy Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington

apply to become temporary career or regular officer candidates. Junior NCO training lasts about fifteen months and stresses leadership qualities and practical skills. An opportunity for further training leading to senior NCO rank usually comes after about four years of service. Particularly qualified NCOs are admitted to a three-year course whose graduates are commissioned as officer specialists with the rank of lieutenant or captain. Officer specialists fill positions corresponding to those occupied by warrant officers in the United States military.

Officer candidates in the army, navy, and air force face a long, arduous training program. Those aspiring to be regular officers, as well as temporary career officers who serve up to twelve years on active duty, generally spend about five years in formal training programs. Officer candidates generally begin their career with nine months of basic training and specialized weapons training followed by twelve months at an officer candidate school—the army school in Hanover, the air force school in Fürstenfeldbruck, or the naval academy at Mürwik in Flensburg.

After a year or more as a small-unit leader, officers with at least a twelve-year enlistment begin a three-year course of study at the Bundeswehr's military academy in Hamburg or the military academy in Munich that leads to an academic degree or technical diploma. Most officers leave the service between the ages of thirty and thirty-two after serving as company commanders or the equivalent. A smaller number of senior captains or navy lieutenants qualify for attendance at the four-month staff officer course at the Federal Armed Forces Command and General Staff College in Hamburg.

Those officers with outstanding grades in the staff officer course and a generally excellent record—about 10 percent of the officers completing the course—are selected to undergo the twenty-four-month general and admiral staff training program, also offered at Hamburg. The remaining 90 percent attend an eight-week staff officer course in various specialties such as operations, logistics, personnel, and transportation. Promotion to the rank of major follows completion of the course. Field-grade officers not selected for general staff training usually retire as lieutenant colonels; general staff officers can expect to be promoted to colonel or naval captain. About 80 percent of the officers who reach the rank of general or admiral have been selected from the general staff group.

Reserves

Under the revised military structure introduced in 1992, the Bundeswehr will become increasingly dependent on the rapid mobilization of reserves to bring both the main combat brigades and the support units up to authorized strengths in an emergency. In early 1995, the reserves of former service members (enlisted to age forty-five; officers and NCOs to age sixty) numbered about 441,900, of whom 358,000 would report to the army, 10,900 to the navy, and 73,000 to the air force. Some 50 percent of the army's main weapons systems depend for their operation on staffing by reservists.

After discharge, former soldiers are liable for reserve service until age forty-five, or until age sixty in time of war. Officers and NCOs are subject to recall until age sixty. Reservists can be called up for one fifteen-day period of training a year and for any number of call-ups of up to three days in emergencies. The average reserve unit assembles once every two years. Reservists with crucial skills tend to be called up more frequently; less-skilled reservists or those in less vital units may not be called up at all. The number of call-ups is determined in the annual defense budget in terms of reserve slots, each slot equivalent to 365 duty days. A total of 4,000 reserve slots were authorized in 1993, which permitted about 100,000 individual call-ups. By contrast, 35,000 slots were authorized per year during the early 1980s.

Morale

The deep reductions in the first half of the 1990s in the size of the active Bundeswehr and the accompanying deactivation and consolidation of units, together with base closings and personnel transfers, have placed serious strains on the morale of the armed forces. Previously, an NCO could expect to pass almost his entire career at a single post, usually in or near his hometown. In the restructured army, many senior NCOs have been reassigned to distant parts of Germany; serious disruptions of family often have been the result. Garrison housing is likely to be unavailable, and affordable housing may be difficult to find off post. In many cases, wives must give up jobs that provide a much-needed second income. Frequently, NCOs prefer to commute long distances to their new posts or simply to live apart from their families. Assignment to eastern Germany,

where there is a strong need for NCO cadres, can be especially burdensome because of poor living conditions there.

The decline in popular support for the Bundeswehr further undermines the morale of service personnel. According to a poll taken in mid-1992, only 47 percent of Germans were convinced that the country needed armed forces, down from 75 percent in 1984. A similar spirit has pervaded the ranks of conscripts and young soldiers who accept military training rather than the alternative of civilian service. Pacifist and church organizations have counseled young Germans on seeking conscientious objector status, and in 1991 the number of conscientious objectors was roughly equal to the number of draftees. A vocal peace movement has also influenced many civilians to reject the company of military professionals. Soldiers often avoid wearing their uniforms in public to escape unfriendly comments or treatment.

NCOs complain that it is difficult to instill discipline and impose a strict training regimen on indifferent conscripts who, in the changed international atmosphere, never expect to be faced with an actual military contingency. Conscripts expend minimal effort during their months of military training, living mainly for weekends with their families. Conscripts generally are garrisoned close to home; some can even commute on a daily basis, treating military service as little different from a factory or office job. Conscripts are entitled to free time to compensate for exercises conducted beyond regular duty hours, although this entitlement will end in 1996.

Some professional soldiers, skeptical that twelve months of service (scheduled to be ten months in 1996) can produce combat-ready soldiers and fearing that political pressures could lead to an even shorter period of service, advocate abandoning the universal military system. One reason for retaining universal military service is the belief that it helps prevent the military from again becoming a distinct caste with few roots in democratic civilian society. Officers hoping to induce promising conscripts to volunteer for longer enlistment also view conscription favorably.

The pride the Bundeswehr takes in the high standards of its personnel and the quality of its training and weaponry was blunted by the absence of German contingents from the international forces assembled to defeat Iraq in 1991. The constitutional limitation on German troop deployments outside the NATO area has been a blow to the prestige of the career mili-

tary men, many of whom feel that they are regarded as shirkers by their NATO partners. The July 1994 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court to permit out-of-area deployment when approved by the Bundestag will reduce the likelihood of such situations occurring again.

Integration of East German Armed Forces

Established in 1956, the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee—NVA) of the German Democratic Republic was considered one of the most formidable elements of the Warsaw Pact's armed might. It comprised about 170,000 personnel in all three services, which could quickly be expanded to a mobilization strength of 350,000. NVA land forces consisted of six standing divisions and five reserve divisions. The army was equipped with some of the Warsaw Pact's most modern weapons, as well as enormous stockpiles of ammunition. The NVA's structure and training followed Soviet lines. Detailed war plans called for the NVA to combine with other Warsaw Pact forces in a powerful and sudden assault against NATO's central region to overrun Western Europe in blitzkrieg fashion. The offensive use of tactical nuclear weapons was assumed.

Although the NVA's weapons and vehicles were maintained at a high level of operational readiness, signs of deterioration and personnel preparedness in manpower were evident even before the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Once the Wall opened, many reservists and some conscripts fled the country, disappearing into West Germany. Authority and morale declined as ordinary soldiers rebelled against strict discipline and military exercises. When soldiers' councils sprang up, NVA commanders bowed to pressure to allow soldiers to wear civilian clothes off post and enjoy relaxed discipline, reduced training time, and an end to political indoctrination. The morale of officers facing the loss of careers and status began to waver as the internal situation worsened and the prospect of unification grew.

Until mid-1990 the leadership of the NVA still hoped that the force might survive as a distinct entity in a reconstituted German state. As a result of the summit agreement between West German chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1990, however, the Soviet Union withdrew its objections to a united Germany's membership in NATO. The NVA was disbanded upon unification, and its facilities and resources were taken over by the Bundeswehr.

On October 3, 1990, the date of unification, control over all NVA commands and border troops passed to the newly created Bundeswehr Eastern Command. The command's function was to deactivate unneeded units, to dispose of surplus matériel and weapons, and to extend support to the withdrawing Soviet forces. The command was terminated after nine months, and the various elements of the former NVA were transferred to the three chiefs of staff and the medical service corps of the Bundeswehr.

The 90,000 NVA service personnel and 47,000 civilian employees who remained were merged into the Bundeswehr on a preliminary basis. It was decided that up to 50,000 of the former NVA troops would be retained as part of the Bundeswehr. Of 14,600 NVA officers, 5,100 were permitted to enter the Bundeswehr for a transition period of two years. Some 70 percent of these—mostly junior officers—would be retained after approval for regular Bundeswehr service and screening to eliminate former members of East Germany's State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst—Stasi). Many of the 25,000 NVA enlisted personnel were assigned to a three-month basic training course with West German units. The dilapidated condition of NVA barracks, mess halls, and other facilities necessitated large expenditures to bring them up to minimal Bundeswehr standards.

All 190 NVA general officers were retired, as were all colonels and many other officers over age fifty-five. Most of those retained were no older than thirty-five. Many former NVA officers were demoted by one or two ranks if they were younger than officers of corresponding ranks in the Bundeswehr. Although East German troops had been paid at a lower scale than their West German counterparts, parity was achieved by 1994. Junior NVA officers, unused to exercising initiative, had to be trained in a new doctrine of command.

A major effort was needed to instill democratic principles of leadership and a new perspective on historical and political questions. NVA officers had been indoctrinated with communist beliefs and had been considered among the most politically reliable elements of the East German state. Although forced to acknowledge that Marxist theories had diverged from social and economic realities in East Germany, many still tended to view communism as a valid, if utopian, political philosophy.

After absorption of the East German armed forces, the six active NVA divisions were converted to brigades, with three brigades in each of two divisions. One division was headquartered at Neubrandenburg and the other at Leipzig. Both divisions became part of IV Corps, which has its headquarters at Potsdam.

During a transition period, the brigades operated Soviet BMP armored vehicles, but Soviet tanks were replaced by Leopards. In the air force, the division at Eggerdorf controlled two fighter wings of Phantom F–4Fs and Soviet MiG–29s, with the Soviet aircraft to be gradually reduced in number. The former East German naval base at Warnemünde on the Baltic Sea was developed as the home port for fast-attack missile craft.

Large quantities of East German weapons were turned over to the Bundeswehr, including 2,300 main battle tanks, 7,800 armored vehicles, 2,500 artillery pieces, 400 combat aircraft, fifty attack helicopters, and many missile and rocket systems. More than 300,000 tons of ammunition had been stockpiled. With exceptions that included MiG–29s, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and some transport helicopters, the Bundeswehr decided against trying to integrate former NVA weapons into its inventory. Ceilings imposed by the CFE Treaty, as well as problems of convertibility and safety, ruled out the wholesale absorption of the weapons. After first being concentrated in special depots, massive stocks of equipment and munitions, except for a few items transferred to other countries, were slated for destruction—a task of unprecedented magnitude.

Defense Budget

From about 1960 until 1990, the West German defense budget rose at a remarkably steady rate, just under 3 percent a year in real terms. If NATO definitions of defense expenditures are applied, outlays remained constant during the 1980s before rising about 4.7 percent in real terms in 1990 and then declining by 6.8 percent in 1991. At the same time, defense spending as a ratio of the overall federal budget decreased from 11.2 percent in 1979 to 9.5 percent in 1989. Outlays for defense also tended to decline as a proportion of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary), from 3.3 percent in 1979 to 2.8 percent in 1989.

The Bundeswehr frequently experienced difficulty securing adequate funds to maintain personnel and equipment at desired levels because of the disinclination of the post-World

War II generation to earmark resources for the buildup of the military establishment. The absence of any palpable threat after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, combined with the unexpectedly high costs of integrating eastern Germany into the Federal Republic, generated even stronger pressures to make deep cuts in defense spending.

From a high of DM57.5 billion (US$35.6 billion) in 1990, the defense budget was scaled back to about DM52.0 billion (US$34 billion) in both 1991 and 1992, to DM49.6 billion (US$31.8 billion) in 1993, and to DM47.2 billion (US$28.6 billion) in 1994. According to Ministry of Defense plans, the annual defense budget should level off at about DM48 billion (US$32 billion) through the year 2006.

Announced cuts in the procurement budget are expected to produce savings of more than DM72 billion in the period between 1992 and 2006. Replacement of the Leopard 2 main battle tank was canceled, and the number of Leopard 2s to be upgraded was reduced. A replacement for the Jaguar antitank vehicle was deleted, and fewer Marder infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers will be introduced. Also, a smaller number of the new Franco-German Tiger PAH–2 attack helicopters will be acquired than originally planned. To effect additional savings, the construction schedule for new frigates and submarines has been stretched out.

According to data compiled by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Germany's military expenditures per capita in 1993 (US$454) were above the NATO Europe average (US$416) and below those of France (US$740) or Britain (US$587). United States expenditures per capita were US$1,153 in the same year. Expressed as a percentage of GNP, military expenditures in 1993 (2.2 percent) were lower than the NATO Europe average (2.7 percent). The 1992 share of military spending in central government expenditures (6.3 percent) was also below the NATO 1992 average of 6.5 percent.

Military Justice

Members of the German armed forces are subject to the civil criminal code and are tried for common criminal offenses in the civil court system. There are no military correction facilities; incarcerated military offenders serve their sentences in ordinary civilian prisons. Soldiers enjoy the same civil rights and liberties possessed by other citizens. They are permitted to

take an active part in political life, be members of political parties, and join trade unions and professional associations. Several courses of action are open to soldiers with complaints or grievances, both within the Bundeswehr and in ordinary courts of law.

Offenses of a specifically military character committed by members of the Bundeswehr are tried in two military court divisions of the Federal Administrative Court and by three military disciplinary courts having a total of twenty-nine chambers. A civilian professional judge presides over each chamber, assisted by honorary military judges. The chambers are the courts of first instance for disciplinary court proceedings against soldiers. The military courts of the Federal Administrative Court are the courts of appeal, each being composed of three civilian judges and two honorary military judges. Sentences range from discharge from service to financial penalties to reduction in rank. The lowest level of offense, such as disobedience or unauthorized absence, may be dealt with informally in a soldier's own unit.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

The service uniform is the most common type of Bundeswehr uniform for general duty and most off-post activity. The army's service uniform consists of a light gray, single-breasted coat and darker gray trousers, worn with a light blue or white shirt, black tie, and black shoes. The peaked, visored cap has been replaced by the beret as the most common form of headgear. Dress uniforms featuring dinner jackets or double-breasted coats are worn by officers for various social occasions. The battle and work uniform is olive green. Camouflage fatigues are also worn on field duty. In all three services, light sand-colored uniforms are available for duty in warmer climates.

The traditional arm-of-service colors appear as lapel facings and as piping on shoulder straps. General officers wear an inner piping of gold braid; other officers wear silver piping. Lapel facings and piping are maroon for general staff, green for infantry, red for artillery, pink for armor, black for engineers, yellow for communications, and various other colors for the remaining branches. Combat troops wear green (infantry), black (armor), or burgundy (airborne) berets. Logistics troops wear blue berets, and combat support troops, such as artillery

GERMAN RANK	LEUTNANT	OBER-LEUTNANT	HAUPTMANN	MAJOR	OBERST-LEUTNANT	OBERST	BRIGADE-GENERAL	GENERAL-MAJOR	GENERAL-LEUTNANT	GENERAL
ARMY AND AIR FORCE										
U.S. RANK TITLE	2D LIEUTENANT	1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL
GERMAN RANK	LEUTNANT ZUR SEE	OBER-LEUTNANT ZUR SEE	KAPITÄN-LEUTNANT	KORVETTEN-KAPITÄN	FREGATTEN-KAPITÄN	KAPITÄN ZUR SEE	FLOTTILLEN-ADMIRAL	KONTER-ADMIRAL	VIZEADMIRAL	ADMIRAL
NAVY										
U.S. RANK TITLE	ENSIGN	LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE	LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER	COMMANDER	CAPTAIN	REAR ADMIRAL LOWER HALF	REAR ADMIRAL UPPER HALF	VICE ADMIRAL	ADMIRAL

NOTE — Army and air force insignia are silver, except for those of brigadier generals and above, which are gold.

Figure 15. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1995



NOTE — A German *Flieger* corresponds to a United States airman basic.

Figure 16. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1995

or engineers, wear red ones. A gold or silver device on the beret denotes the individual branch of service.

The naval forces wear the traditional navy blue, double-breasted coat and trousers; enlisted personnel wear either a white shirt or a navy blue shirt with the traditional navy collar. White uniforms provide an alternative for summer. The officer's dress cap is mounted with a gold anchor surrounded by a wreath. The visor of the admiral's cap bears a double row of oak leaves.

The air force service uniform consists of a blue-gray jacket and trousers with a light blue shirt, dark blue tie, and black shoes. Olive battle dress similar to the army fatigue uniform is worn in basic training and during other field duty. Flying personnel wear wings on their right breast. Technical personnel wear a modified wing device with a symbol in its center denoting service specialization. The latter is bronze, silver, or gold, depending on one's length of service in the specialty. Wings, superimposed over a wreath, in gold, silver, or bronze, depending on rank, are also worn on the service or field cap.

Officer ranks correspond directly to equivalent ranks in the United States Armed Forces (see fig. 15). Officer rank insignia are worn on shoulder straps or shoulder boards; in the case of naval officers, rank is indicated by gold stripes on the lower sleeve of the blue service jacket and on shoulder boards of the white uniform. The semicircular wreath on the shoulder straps is gold for general officers and silver for field grade officers.

NCO ranks are based on those used long ago in the Prussian armies, and it is difficult to relate them directly to United States NCO ranks (see fig. 16). In the army and air force, a *Hauptgefreiter* corresponds approximately to a private first class or airman first class. An *Unteroffizier*, with the responsibilities of a squad leader, is the lowest-ranking sergeant, followed by the *Stabsunteroffizier, Feldwebel, Oberfeldwebel,* and *Hauptfeldwebel.* Ranks of army and air force enlisted personnel are designated by stripes, chevrons, and looped chevrons worn on shoulder straps. Naval enlisted rank designations are worn on the upper sleeve along with a symbol of the service specialization (rating). Army and air force officer candidates hold the separate ranks of *Gefreiter, Fahnenjunker,* and *Oberfähnrich* and wear the equivalent enlisted rank designations plus a silver diamond on their sleeves. Medical personnel of all three services wear a version of the traditional caduceus (staff with entwined serpents) on their shoulder straps or sleeve.

Citizens in Uniform

When the Federal Republic was founded in 1949, and during the ensuing years, public discussion of the re-creation of a German armed force was unavoidably shaped by the memories of wartime disaster and the terrible legacy of German militarism. For many Germans, even the thought of rearming the country was distasteful. Those citizens favoring the formation of new armed forces were convinced that these forces would have to represent a near-complete break with German military history. The consensus was that the military would require a constitutional basis for its existence, with the Bundeswehr unequivocally controlled by civilian authorities.

The planners of the new Bundeswehr wanted to be sure that no images of the armed forces (Reichswehr) of the Weimar Republic or Hitler's Wehrmacht would be associated with it. The twin concepts of "citizens in uniform" and *Innere Führung* (inner leadership) were introduced to ensure that there could be no resurgence of German militarism. Behind the emphasis on citizens in uniform was the concept that military personnel were of the people and worked for the people, not part of a military elite that would precipitate a "state within a state" phenomenon. In the new Bundeswehr, the constitutional rights of service members are guaranteed, even though those rights might be restricted at times because of the special nature of military duties.

Military personnel do not give up their political status as citizens when they don a uniform. They continue to be members of the community from which they entered the service, as well as of the West German political community as a whole. They can run for office on local councils and for seats in the parliaments of the *Länder* and the Bundestag. Regulars and volunteers are permitted to join a military or civil service union and have the right of free expression, although by law they have the obligation to exercise discipline and restraint in expressing their views publicly.

The concept of *Innere Führung* imposes the responsibility upon all military personnel to defend their country according to the dictates of conscience rather than out of blind loyalty. For the NCOs, officers, and generals who formed the nucleus of the new forces in 1956, most of whom were veterans of the Wehrmacht or Luftwaffe of World War II, adherence to the new principles meant unlearning principles that had guided them in their earlier service. Officers and NCOs received train-

ing to help them respect and impart the principles of *Innere Führung*, including the role of the Bundeswehr in the state and society and the duties and rights of individual service personnel.

The West German military and the political leadership had difficulty agreeing on the measures needed to forge a new democratic spirit that would break with Germany's military past. Specific issues continued to be debated during the 1980s—whether some traditions could properly be carried over from the Wehrmacht, the place of military pageantry, public oath-taking by new soldiers, and attitudes toward the Wehrmacht's complicity in the crimes of the Nazi period and toward the officers implicated in the 1944 attempt on Hitler's life.

A strong antimilitarist element within the left wing of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—SPD) repeatedly protested against military symbolism and public military ceremonies. In a wider sense, these protests reflected the reluctance among young people to devote time to military service and objections to a NATO strategy of defending Europe by using nuclear weapons in the heart of Germany.

An innovation to help ensure civilian oversight of the Bundeswehr was the establishment of the defense ombudsman (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Federal Armed Forces), who is appointed by the Bundestag. The ombudsman is responsible for overseeing the administration of the services while upholding the constitutional rights of individual service personnel. All Bundeswehr personnel have the right of direct petition to the ombudsman; several thousand exercise this right each year. The ombudsman and staff can also be called upon by the Bundestag or the Bundestag Defense Committee to investigate specific problems.

Personnel Policies

Serious shortages of eligible conscripts began to appear in the late 1980s. Because of the declining birth rate in the 1970s and the increasing number of conscientious objectors, the Bundeswehr struggled to meet its recruiting goals. However, the reduction of the Bundeswehr's active-duty soldiers to 370,000 by the end of 1994, as required by the 1990 Two-Plus-Four Treaty and CFE Treaty, meant that the annual requirement for conscripts could be decreased from 180,000 to 140,000. Also, the incorporation of East Germany into the Fed-

eral Republic added significantly to the pool of potential inductees. About 50,000 personnel in 1994 were career soldiers transferred from the NVA or draftees from the new *Länder.*

The Bundeswehr has been handicapped by a shortage of NCOs, a problem that is expected to become more critical as the army increases its dependence on career cadres to staff reserve battalions subject to mobilization. A soldier must meet high entry qualifications, undergo extensive training, and complete years of service before reaching the rank of sergeant, which entitles him to make the military a career and remain in the service until retirement. Reliance on experienced NCOs is a distinctive feature of the Bundeswehr, where the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel is the lowest in Europe. An infantry company may have a captain and one lieutenant, but most platoon leaders and the company executive officer are usually master sergeants. However, NCOs of the former NVA are generally confined to specialist categories, without experience or training as unit leaders.

Service Obligations

Under the Obligatory Military Service Law enacted in 1956, all males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight were subject to conscription for military service. In 1985 the period of active duty was increased from fifteen to eighteen months, but before the new provision was introduced, the term of service was reduced to twelve months, effective in 1990. Beginning in 1996, conscripts will be required to serve ten months. The Basic Law guarantees the right to refuse military service on grounds of conscience.

During the 1970s, about 35,000 young men applied for conscientious objector status annually. Under liberalized rules and the decline of the overt threat from the east, the number who claimed the right to alternative civilian service in 1992 (134,000) was about as high as the number of draftees needed by the Bundeswehr. Alternative service, which is one-third longer than military service, usually takes the form of such social service as serving as a hospital orderly. In fact, one of the obstacles to shifting to an all-volunteer force is the effect it would have on the health and social agencies that have come to depend upon conscientious objectors to perform essential work.

Under Bundeswehr policy, all soldiers begin their careers as conscripts. Those performing satisfactorily may be induced—

in part through considerable financial incentives—to volunteer for a short-term enlistment of two years, or as temporary career personnel for four years. Those attaining NCO rank during their four-year enlistment period may then be permitted to serve up to fifteen years or longer if accepted as career professionals. The army has been able to recruit about 10 percent of its conscripts for extended service.

The maximum retirement age of career sergeants is fifty-three. The mandatory retirement age rises, depending on rank, to fifty-nine for colonels and sixty for generals and medical officers. Special rules may apply to particular specialties.

Two branches of the Bundeswehr, the medical and health service and military music, accept women as volunteers. As of the mid-1990s, about 900 women were in uniform. No significant expansion of the role of women is foreseen, particularly in light of the overall contraction of the services. The Basic Law states: "Women shall not be required by law to render service in any unit of the armed forces. On no account shall they be employed in any service involving the use of arms." Of more than 50,000 women occupying civilian positions in national defense, only a few serve in higher civil service posts, although officially women enjoy the same career opportunities available to men.

Benefits

The pay of conscripts amounted to about US$160 a month in the mid-1990s. Bonuses are paid at Christmas and upon discharge. Conscripts can be compensated for loss of their civilian wages, up to 60 percent of the lost income in the case of married personnel. Those recalled for reserve duty are also compensated for lost earnings. Longer-term volunteers receive about US$1,100 a month. Basic monthly pay for a sergeant as of early 1995 was about US$1,350 and for a sergeant first class about US$1,900. In addition to basic pay, allowances are paid for housing (about US$600 a month), dependents, hazardous duty, ship duty, and other special circumstances.

All temporary career and regular service personnel are entitled to a range of benefits, including compensation for duty in excess of fifty-six hours per week and change-of-station allowances. These include disbursements to cover extra educational expenses for children; a monthly travel allowance to distant duty stations; and a rental subsidy if local rent is high in pro-

portion to income. Working wives are entitled to preferential employment at new duty stations.

Every qualified regular serviceman can expect to advance within his career category, to sergeant first class in the case of NCOs, to captain or naval lieutenant in the case of officer specialists, and to lieutenant colonel or naval commander for line officers. Upon retirement, regular personnel can be entitled to a pension of up to 75 percent of their final salary. In addition, they receive a one-time payment to compensate for the disadvantage of retiring earlier than civil servants, plus a 5 percent supplement to their retirement. Special reintegration allowances and preferential treatment for employment in the public sector are also available to service members, especially those below retirement age but with at least twelve years of service.

Defense Production and Export

Germany's capacity to produce its own arms and military equipment grew simultaneously with the development of the Bundeswehr. As a matter of policy, arms production is confined to the private sector. There are no government-operated defense plants, and most companies involved in arms manufacture are predominantly engaged in civilian industrial production. Private industry accounts for 85 percent of all military research and development, procurement, and maintenance. Nevertheless, defense production represents no more than 3.4 percent of the total value of output by the country's processing industries. Although some 225,000 persons work on defense contracts, this group constitutes less than 1 percent of the workforce.

The Armaments Division of the Ministry of Defense has responsibility for planning, controlling, and supervising the armaments sector. Under it the Federal Office for Military Technology and Procurement (Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung—BWB) in Koblenz procures all defense matériel. The BWB is a civilian agency staffed by some 18,300 persons, about one-third of whom work at seven armaments research and testing centers, each responsible for a particular category of systems. Certain major joint projects, such the Tornado and the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA), are independent of the BWB's supervision.

The Bundeswehr estimates that about 70 percent of its major procurement items are produced as part of international projects. These have included the EFA and Tornado aircraft

(both developed in cooperation with Britain, Italy, and Spain); the Alpha Jet, the Roland short-range air defense system, and the Tiger PAH–2 antitank helicopter (all joint projects with France); and the multiple-launch rocket and NATO identification systems, developed in cooperation with several NATO countries.

Only in the aerospace and munitions industries does defense account for 50 percent or more of sales. Among the largest firms is Deutsche Aerospace (DASA), founded in 1989 to incorporate the aerospace and other defense activities of the Daimler-Benz group. DASA has a controlling interest in Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), located at Ottobrunn near Munich, which produces combat aircraft, helicopters, and HOT, Milan, and Exocet missiles. It also controls Dornier, which produces various equipment and aircraft and which has been a major contractor in the EFA program. Motoren und Turbinen Union (MTU), another unit of DASA, is a large producer of parts for aircraft, ships, and tanks.

Rheinmetall Berlin, another major defense contractor, produces armored vehicles, artillery, and munitions. Rheinmetall is based in Berlin and Düsseldorf. In 1991 it assumed a controlling interest in Krupp Mak Maschinenbau, thereby adding tracked armored vehicles, such as the Marder, to its output. The Krupp industrial group's defense sector was thenceforth limited to naval weapons systems. AEG-Telefunken is a leading supplier of electronics and radar; Krauss-Maffei of Munich produces the Leopard tank.

According to ACDA, known German exports of arms were valued at an estimated US$1.1 billion in 1993 and constituted 0.3 percent of total German exports; arms imports had a value of US$250 million and amounted to 0.1 percent of total imports. During the 1991–93 period, nearly half of Germany's arms transfers were made to other NATO countries, notably Portugal, Greece, the United States, Turkey, and Norway. Switzerland, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Finland were also substantial clients, while smaller quantities were shipped to Singapore and Colombia. In the Middle East, arms valued at US$820 million were exported to five countries during this period, Saudi Arabia taking US$525 million and Israel US$200 million.

West Germany's grant-type military assistance to other NATO countries focused on Turkey, Greece, and Portugal. The major recipient was Turkey, a beneficiary of German military

aid since 1964. Arms transfers included Leopard tanks, Milan antitank missiles, and retrofit kits for M–48 tanks. West Germany also assisted Turkey with infrastructure and defense manufacturing facilities.

Although West Germany imposed controls on weapons exports, repeated charges have been made that arms shipments by private West German suppliers were not carefully monitored. In the 1980s, evidence mounted that West German firms were instrumental in assisting Iraq and Libya in developing weapons of mass destruction. In 1988, based on information supplied by the United States implicating West German firms in the construction of a poison gas plant at Rabka, Libya, the owner of one company was sentenced to prison for illegal exports and tax evasion. In early 1993, the German government announced that German firms were being investigated for delivering equipment for a second chemical weapons factory in Libya. In a report issued in 1991 by the International Atomic Energy Agency, thirteen Western companies, more than half of them German, were identified as having contributed to the Iraqi nuclear program.

In 1992, after extensive international publicity over the inadequate enforcement of arms controls, the Bundestag approved legislation to create a new government monitoring agency. The new law authorized screening of mail and use of wiretaps to facilitate investigations of suspected violators. Harsher punishments could be imposed, including confiscation of profits from illicit arms sales and imprisonment of company officers.

Under German arms policy, export permits are denied for the sale of weapons to areas of tension. This policy has applied in particular to the Middle East, where Germany felt a moral obligation to avoid actions that could endanger Israel. In 1992, despite a ban imposed by the Bundestag, at least fifteen Leopard tanks were shipped to Turkey, where they were apparently used by the Turkish army to attack strongholds of the rebel Kurdish Workers' Party. The minister of defense, Gerhard Stoltenberg, claimed that the shipment had been approved without his knowledge. Nevertheless, Stoltenberg was forced to resign from the government in the ensuing uproar.

In early 1993, the Bundestag disapproved the delivery of submarines and frigates to the Taiwan government, although SAM systems produced in conjunction with the United States were approved for sale under the rationale that they were purely defensive weapons. Diesel engines for a large quantity of

French tanks sold to the United Arab Emirates were also approved for export.

Domestic critics of Germany's arms export practices assert that German firms have easily circumvented controls through coproduction schemes or deliveries of key parts to other countries; through licensed production in other countries of arms that reach prohibited users; through the sale of technology and whole weapons plants, of which Germany is the world's foremost exporter; and through sales of items improperly labeled civilian goods. Critics claim that the UN embargo on arms sales to South Africa was violated by false labeling of troop transport vehicles, helicopters, and minesweepers.

Foreign Military Relations

Since the end of World War II, the military forces of six NATO Allies have been deployed in West Germany—first as occupation troops. Soviet troops were stationed in East Germany as part of the Warsaw Pact forces. Although the United States maintained the largest of the foreign NATO contingents, Britain and France also deployed substantial forces. Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands maintained smaller troop units, heavily dependent on reinforcement to be of value in crises. Events in Europe culminating in German unification in October 1990, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the Russian compliance with the terms of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty to evacuate its troops from the territory of the former East Germany by late 1994 ended the necessity for NATO to maintain large standing forces in the European theater. As a result, all NATO countries have made deep cuts in their forces based in Germany.

Germany grants NATO forces on its territory the use of military installations and training areas free of charge—airfields, barracks, schools, hospitals, and logistics facilities. Thousands of housing units have been placed at the disposal of the stationing countries. The financial value of German support for Allied bases is balanced in some degree by the impact of Allied wages paid to German employees, orders by Allied forces placed with German firms, and spending by soldiers and their families in Germany. By the 1980s and the 1990s, the physical burden of providing bases for large numbers of Allied troops had become a cause of widespread complaint. Low-level training flights and large-scale exercises that sometimes result in injuries and prop-

erty damage are particular sources of discontent, especially when carried out at night or on weekends.

By early 1995, about 100,000 United States troops were still stationed in Germany. United States army forces in Germany include one army headquarters, one corps headquarters, and two divisions; the air force has two air force headquarters, one tactical fighter wing, one combat support wing, one air control wing, and one airlift wing. Armor and other weapons are stockpiled for units in the United States earmarked as reinforcements for Europe.

British forces in Germany numbered about 38,000 in mid-1995. British forces in Germany include one corps headquarters (multinational), one armored division, and an air force group headquarters and two air bases. Belgium and the Netherlands maintain about 10,000 and 3,000 troops, respectively.

France maintained about 15,000 troops in Germany as of mid-1995, reduced from 44,000 in 1989. Most of these troops are part of the Eurocorps. The position of France among NATO countries maintaining forces in Germany is unique. French units are not committed to NATO, and the participation of France in the event of conflict is subject to a decision by the French president. Nevertheless, French staff and troops cooperate in certain NATO exercises and maneuvers.

International Military Missions

In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that Bundeswehr units could participate in UN and other operations outside the NATO area if such actions had the approval of the Bundestag. That decision was preceded by much political controversy in the early 1990s, including charges from opponents of out-of-area deployment of Bundeswehr elements that provisions of the Basic Law were being ignored (see The Out-of-Area Debate, ch. 8).

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Germany received international criticism for its unwillingness to assume a role proportionate to its military power and political importance. The strong pacifist streak in German society again manifested itself in anti-United States and antiwar demonstrations that contributed to an impression in some quarters of German indifference to Iraq's aggression. Germany did make a contribution of US$10 billion to the UN operation against Iraq, but its military actions were confined to the NATO area. German naval units and mine countermeasure ships were shifted to the Mediterra-

nean to cover for NATO vessels sent to the Persian Gulf. After hostilities ended, German ships took part in mine-clearing operations in the gulf. German Alpha Jets and air defense missiles were deployed to Turkey, largely as a political gesture to demonstrate solidarity with other NATO countries involved in the conflict with Iraq. Later, German troops and helicopters were sent to northern Iran and Iraq to aid Kurdish refugees.

In December 1992, the government pledged to provide some 1,600 troops to regions of Somalia where peace had been restored to assist in reconstruction and the distribution of relief goods. The contingent included specialized logistic and medical units plus a small protective detachment of infantry troops. Despite political opposition, the government said it was determined to deploy troops to areas of Somalia where there was no fighting. German troops subsequently participated successfully in the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

German armed forces participated to a limited extent in several other UN-organized operations, generally ones with a humanitarian purpose that would evoke minimal criticism that the Basic Law was being flouted. In 1992 a group of some 150 Bundeswehr medical personnel went to Cambodia to provide health care to the 2,200 members of the UN mission in that nation. Amid objections from opposition parties, a destroyer and three reconnaissance aircraft were sent to join forces from seven other NATO countries in an attempt to monitor the UN embargo of Serbia. German troops were involved in delivery of food to the besieged city of Sarajevo but avoided airdrops that could result in conflict. Service by German crews on unarmed NATO reconnaissance aircraft to help enforce the "no-fly zone" was only narrowly approved by the Federal Constitutional Court.

Internal Security

The German legal system is the product of many centuries of development, starting with the tribal laws of the first Germans. Those indigenous customs were influenced and changed under Roman law and later by the laws that prevailed in the Holy Roman Empire. Feudal law also had a strong influence. When more formal law and legal institutions appeared in the eighteenth century, codes of law and police systems were left to the individual territorial entities. The codes that evolved were mixtures of German, Roman, and ecclesiastical law.

German soldiers serving with United Nations peacekeeping forces arrive in Somalia in 1993.
Courtesy German Information Center, New York

The drive toward political unification during the nineteenth century was accompanied by a trend toward legal unification, especially in commercial matters. In other areas of law, however, the prerogatives of each political entity still governed. Only after the achievement of political unification under Prussian dominance in 1871 was a start made on drawing up German legal codes.

The codes and laws on police and penal institutions adopted after unification showed in varying degrees the influence of the Napoleonic Code. Patterns were established that, despite modifications, continued to prevail. The most important of the early models were the Penal Code of 1871, defining three classes of imprisonment still in use in 1995; the procedural codes of 1877; the law of 1877 establishing a unified court system; and the comprehensive Civil Code, which took effect in its full scope of 2,385 paragraphs in 1900.

Parallel with the courts and laws, there developed a structure of penal institutions and a police system, both characterized by the efficiency for which German administrative organs had long been noted. Although their administration was somewhat

relaxed during the Weimar period (1918–33), these bureaucracies tended toward rigidity. The police and penal authorities saw their positions and responsibilities as servants of the state as overshadowing any obligation of service to the people.

When the Nazis came to power in 1933, they capitalized on the tendencies of the legal bureaucracy, centralizing control of the police and administration of the courts and making widespread use of special courts. Ostensibly, the laws and institutions remained the same. However, the spirit of the law and the legal system were gradually and totally subverted by the agenda of the Nazi leadership. When the "sound instincts of the people" demanded it, as interpreted by the Nazis, the rule of law was completely ignored.

The impact of Nazi ideology was greatest on the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Third Reich greatly broadened the definition of criminal activity, particularly in the category of crimes against the state, and made punishment much harsher. The Code of Criminal Procedure was distorted almost beyond recognition by the activities of the Nazi-inspired People's Court, in which those convicted of crimes against the state were often sentenced to death. In twelve years, an extensive network of special and summary courts of indeterminate jurisdiction was developed.

The police, whose powers and responsibilities were significantly broadened, became tools of the ruling party under the direct control of the minister of interior. The regular police—including city and town forces, motorized gendarmerie in rural areas, and administrative police, who administered codes and regulations—were supplemented by much more powerful internal security units. These included the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei), which incorporated the Criminal Investigation Police and the Border Police, as well as the newly formed Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei—Gestapo). Two other of Hitler's organizations, the Storm Troops (Sturmabteilung—SA) and the Guard Detachment (Schutz-Staffel—SS), in company with the Gestapo, became infamous as instruments of Nazi brutality.

After World War II, each of the Allied authorities permitted the formation of West German police forces, although under terms that reflected their own police structures and traditions. In all three Western zones, however, the police were decentralized, democratized, and demilitarized. Some restrictions were lifted within two years as Cold War tensions grew, and certain

police functions necessitated central rather than local direction. The Federal Border Force was created to handle special functions that overlapped *Land* jurisdictions. In addition to this force, federal agencies were created to handle interstate criminal matters and overall security affairs.

Federal Police Agencies

Established in 1951, the Federal Border Force (Bundesgrenzschutz—BGS) was the first federal police organization permitted by the Allied occupation authorities. During the early 1950s, there were frequent incidents on the borders with East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the occupation authorities became convinced of the need for a competent border police. Even though the BGS is organized along paramilitary lines, that is, in battalions, companies, and platoons, and is armed as light infantry, it remains a police force controlled by the Ministry of Interior rather than by the Ministry of Defense. The strength of the BGS was 24,000 in early 1995. The BGS is equipped with armored cars, machine guns, automatic rifles, tear gas, hand grenades, rifle grenades, and antitank weapons. All personnel on border duty wear sidearms. Some units have light aircraft and helicopters to facilitate rapid access to remote border areas and for patrol and rescue missions. A coast guard force (Bundesgrenzschutz-See) of approximately 550 members forms a part of the BGS. It is equipped with fourteen large patrol craft and several helicopters.

In addition to controlling Germany's border, the BGS serves as a federal reserve force to deal with major disturbances and other emergencies beyond the scope of *Land* police. The BGS guards airports and foreign embassies, and several highly trained detachments are available for special crisis situations requiring demolition equipment, helicopters, or combat vehicles. After shortcomings in police procedures and training were revealed by the terrorist attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics, a BGS task force known as Special Group 9 (BGS-9) was formed to deal with terrorist incidents, especially hostage situations. The BGS-9 won world attention when it rescued eighty-six passengers on a Lufthansa airliner hijacked to Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1977.

A military rank structure similar to that of the Bundeswehr was replaced in the mid-1970s by civil service-type personnel grades. The service uniform is green, but field units also wear camouflage fatigues and, at times, steel helmets.

Another central police agency, the Federal Criminal Investigation Office (Bundeskriminalamt—BKA), with approximately 3,000 agents, operates nationwide from headquarters in Wiesbaden. Similar in some respects to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, the BKA is a clearinghouse for criminal intelligence records. It provides assistance to *Länder* in forensic matters, research, and criminal investigations. It is also the national point of contact for the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). The BKA enters cases only when requested by *Land* authorities, or in cases involving two or more *Länder.* The BKA is involved in combating various terrorist gangs, which have plagued the country since the 1960s.

Two federal agencies involved in security matters are the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst—BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz—BfV). Based in Munich, the BND is restricted to the investigation of threats originating abroad. It depends heavily on wiretapping and other surveillance techniques applied to international communications. Such activities are authorized only to counter the danger of an armed threat to the country, but intelligence authorities have pressed for the added power to monitor suspected international traffickers of weapons and drugs. The BfV is primarily a domestic intelligence-gathering service concerned with espionage, treason, and sedition. It has no powers of arrest and cannot use force, but it carries out surveillance and supplies the BKA and other police agencies with information on international crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and other illegal activities. Its main office is in Cologne. Similar offices exist in each *Land*; although they cooperate closely with the federal office, they operate under the control of *Land* authorities.

Land Police Agencies

Below the federal level, police forces are organized by the *Länder* and are collectively known as *Land* police (Landpolizei). The forces are organized by cities, towns, or rural communities, but all are integral components of the police forces of the *Land* in which they are located. The *Land* minister of interior supervises police operations in his or her jurisdiction. Although the internal organizations differ somewhat, all *Land* police are divided into Protective Police (Schutzpolizei—"Schupos"), a uniformed service carrying out routine law and

order duties, and Criminal Police (Kriminalpolizei—"Kripos"), who carry out criminal investigations. The separate Administrative Police formerly had duties that included the registration of residents and the issuance of passports, identity cards, and various permits. These functions have been transferred to civil government departments in nearly all *Länder.*

Readiness Police (Bereitschaftspolizei—"Bepos") are available in each *Land* for riot control although their primary function is training police recruits. The Readiness Police receive standardized weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment from the federal government. An office in the federal Ministry of Interior monitors and coordinates the deployment of Readiness Police units, which can be called upon to assist the police of other *Länder* in case of riots or other civil disturbances.

Although the *Land* police are regulated by sixteen different legislatures and are, in fact, different police forces, there has been an increasing tendency toward standardization of police activities nationwide. Concerns about terrorism and the growth of organized crime have strengthened the movement to centralize police procedures and operations. Since 1979 the police of all *Länder* have worn the same uniform, consisting of a forest-green jacket, brown trousers, yellow shirt, and white cap.

An ordinary police officer (*Polizeihauptwachtmeister*) wears a single green star on his or her shoulder straps, denoting rank in the first echelon of the police service. In the regular progression, a uniformed police officer may expect to retire at age sixty with the rank of *Hauptmeister* (four green stars). The rank of *Polizeikommissar* (one silver star), corresponding to the former rank of police lieutenant, is the first step of the upper echelon, which ascends through *Ersterhauptkommissar* (four silver stars). The highest echelon of the police begins with *Polizeirat* (one gold star) and culminates with the *Land* director of police (gold half-wreath with one star). About 10 percent of the police attain the upper echelon, and 1 percent reach the highest executive level.

Unlike the military services, which do not recruit women, the *Land* police have had women members since the forces were reconstituted after World War II. Initially, female officers were assigned to cases involving juveniles and women, working in plainclothes without weapons. Since the mid-1970s, policewomen have performed general police duties; many fill the uniformed ranks, although their acceptance varies by *Land.*

Women are not, however, included in units of the Readiness Police or the BGS.

Police training is primarily the responsibility of the individual *Länder*, although the federal government provides assistance and coordination. The high level of police professionalism is attributed in large degree to the length and thoroughness of training. The situation is different in the five new *Länder* of eastern Germany. Long accustomed to a compliant society, police forces of the eastern *Länder* have been described as understaffed, undertrained, poorly equipped, and woefully unprepared to cope with the challenges posed by the growing numbers of skinheads and neo-Nazis engaged in violent hate crimes against foreign workers and refugees.

Most police recruits spend about three years in combined training and service in the Readiness Police, although the training time may be shorter depending on previous education. Recruits are exempt from military service. Training encompasses a six-month course at a police school that provides a grounding in law, legal procedures, and police conduct. After about six years of duty as a patrol officer, an individual with an outstanding record who does well on a highly competitive examination can go on to two or three years at a higher police school or a college of public administration to qualify for the upper echelon. The very few candidates who qualify for the highest ranks of the police study for one year at the Federal Police Leadership Academy in Münster-Hiltrup.

The Readiness Police are assigned to barracks where they are organized along military lines into squads, platoons, and 120- to 150-member training or standby companies. In most *Länder*, the Readiness Police contingent consists of one 600- to 800-member battalion, but in six of the larger *Länder* they are organized into regiments. Duties vary according to local requirements. In Hamburg, for example, Readiness Police patrol the subway system, assist in police raids in the red-light district, and are present at large demonstrations and soccer matches. Their units are equipped with their own transport, tents, and rations, enabling them to be shifted quickly to other *Länder* without having to rely on outside support. The Readiness Police have water cannons and armored vehicles but are armed with lighter weapons than those of the BGS.

The Criminal Police enjoy greater prestige and generally receive more compensation than Protective Police officers with comparable service time. Most Criminal Police candidates are

regular police officers who have done well in police school and in their first years of street duty. After rigorous screening and examination, a small number are chosen to receive a technical education in criminology at a police college. Those completing the course then serve a three-year apprenticeship before attaining full status in the Criminal Police.

Criminal Justice

Law in Germany is codified and is predominantly federal. The Penal Code is a revised version of a legal code introduced after the unification of Germany in 1871 and is therefore influenced by Prussian legal concepts. The system of criminal justice is derived from the civil law, rather than the common law that provides the basis for the systems used in Britain and the United States. In its modern development in Western Europe, including Germany, civil law incorporates ideas of nonconfinement punishments, work-release programs, and other measures aimed at rehabilitation rather than the mere isolation of a criminal from society. Toward these goals, the West German state in the mid-1970s promulgated the revised Code of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Prison Act. West Germany also joined several other civil-law countries by abolishing the death penalty, which was done under the Basic Law. East Germany abolished the death penalty in 1987.

Even before the unification of Germany was completed in 1990, East German laws had been modified to delete provisions empowering authorities to detain people for exercising freedom of expression, association, assembly, and movement. The East German prison population fell from 24,000 to 5,000 persons because so many political crimes had been abolished. Following unification, West Germany's criminal code was adopted, with minor modifications.

Criminal cases get their initial hearing at any of the courts of the three-tiered *Land* system—local courts, regional or *Land* courts, and the higher regional (appellate) *Land* courts—and can be appealed or revised from the lowest to the next two levels or from all three courts to the highest court in the criminal justice system—the Federal Court of Justice (see the Judiciary, ch. 7). Prosecutions leading to a maximum sentence of one year are heard by a judge of the local court. In more serious cases involving possible sentences of up to three years, the judge is assisted by two lay judges, comparable to jury members in a common law system. Criminal cases in which the sentence

exceeds three years are referred to a *Land* court, where they are heard by three judges and three to six lay judges. A *Land* court of appeal presided over by five judges usually hears only appeals from the lower courts, plus cases concerning extraordinary crimes in violation of the Basic Law, such as treason and genocide.

Individual rights of citizens are guaranteed in the Basic Law and in the country's statutes. The law prevents police from subjecting suspects to physical abuse, torture, drugs, deceit, and hypnosis. The record of the police in conforming to these guidelines is good. A suspect has to be brought before a judge no later than the day following arrest, and the judge is obliged to issue a warrant of arrest specifying reasons for detention or else release the suspect. A relative or another person selected by the detainee has to be notified immediately of any detention lasting beyond the day after arrest. Accused persons have the right of free access to legal counsel, although this right has been restricted in the cases of some terrorists who used contacts with lawyers to continue terrorist activity while in prison. Bail bonds exist but are seldom employed. Criminal trials are held in public; protection against double jeopardy and the usual guarantees of due process are observed.

The judiciary is free from political influence and intimidation by terrorists. Substantial progress has been made in reforming the court system of the former East Germany to meet West German standards. Nevertheless, many experienced East German judges had to be disqualified for political and judicial reasons. Judges introduced from West Germany are handicapped by the unfamiliar circumstances in which they are required to function.

Incidence of Crime and Incarceration

Criminal acts are classified as felonies or misdemeanors, the latter encompassing less serious crimes but including many acts considered felonies in most common-law countries. Crimes categorized as misdemeanors include extortion, fraud, larceny, and even negligent homicide. Felonies are punishable by prison sentences of one year or more; misdemeanors can be punished by shorter prison terms, by combined imprisonment and fines, or solely by fines.

By far the largest number of persons convicted in German courts are fined. In 1991, although nearly 600,000 persons were sentenced for criminal acts in the old *Länder*, the number

of persons committed to prison was only about 100,000. About 80 percent of this number were sentenced to a prison term of less than one year, 16 percent were sentenced to between one and five years, and 1 percent were sentenced to between five and fifteen years. Fifty-six persons received life sentences in 1991.

Approximately 43.8 percent of the 6,750,000 crimes registered in 1993 were solved by the authorities. By far the largest category of crime was theft, which accounted for 61.5 percent of the total, followed by damage to property (8.6 percent), fraud (7.8 percent), and crimes of violence (2.4 percent). In the old *Länder* and including all of Berlin, there were 4,230 murders and incidents of manslaughter, of which 84.7 percent were solved by the authorities.

According to federal police data, the crime rate has increased since unification in 1990, especially in the new *Länder*, where the crime rate before unification was lower than that of the old *Länder*. During 1991 the number of criminal offenses recorded amounted to 5 million, compared with 6.3 million in 1992 and nearly 6.8 million in 1993. To some extent, the upsurge in crime was associated with the radical upheaval in the former East Germany and the accompanying loss of jobs and benefits. In 1993, for example, the number of registered crimes in the new *Länder* amounted to 1.4 million, compared with 1.1 million in 1992. The old *Länder* and all of Berlin, in contrast, had 5.3 million registered crimes in 1993, compared with 5.2 million in 1992.

The large concentration of refugees, foreign workers, and illegal immigrants, combined with weaker border controls, has attracted a growing underworld of organized crime in Berlin and in other major German cities, which have a crime rate three times higher than towns with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants. The most common crimes involve narcotics, automobile theft (especially of late-model luxury cars), arms smuggling, counterfeiting, prostitution, gambling, and white-collar crime. Germany is both a market for narcotics and a transshipment point for drugs destined for Scandinavia and Britain. Marijuana enters from the Middle East and North Africa, cocaine from Central and South America, and heroin from Pakistan, Turkey, and Southeast Asia.

Dissidence and Terrorist Activity

Opposition to the West German government has existed

since its inception in 1949, and, in keeping with German tradition, radical students have sometimes been in the front ranks of those protesting various policies and situations: the use of nuclear power and the presence of atomic weapons; the government's policy toward the universities; and United States involvement in Vietnam and in the Persian Gulf War. Violence and injuries to both sides were common in confrontations between protesters and police. By the 1960s, individuals on the fringes of mainstream student organizations dropped out to form extremist groups. A lethal succession of terrorist activities followed, continuing throughout the 1970s and at a somewhat reduced level in the 1980s.

The left-wing Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion—RAF) became internationally known through its bloody exploits in West Germany and through its contacts with terrorist groups in other countries. The RAF was an outgrowth of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, which held up banks, bombed police stations, and attacked United States army bases in the 1970s. By 1975 some ninety members of the gang were in custody. In the middle of her trial in 1976, Ulrike Meinhof, one of the RAF ringleaders, committed suicide in prison. Another member, Andreas Baader, was sentenced to life imprisonment, but in 1977 he too took his own life in prison.

By the early 1980s, the original leaders of the RAF had been succeeded by a new and equally violent group that was Marxist-Leninist in orientation and saw itself as part of an international movement to topple the power structures of the capitalist world. A core group of twenty to thirty terrorists carried out the most deadly operations of the RAF. Periodic attacks were mounted against United States and NATO military leaders and bases and against prominent German officials and businesspeople. Demonstrations were held throughout the country to support a hunger strike by RAF prisoners and to protest the introduction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. RAF violence had declined somewhat by 1990, although the RAF and other left-wing radical groups like the Revolutionary Cells carried out attacks against United States government and business targets. In November 1989, the chief executive of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, was assassinated. In April 1991, Detlev Rohwedder, the director of the Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency), the mammoth agency charged with privatizing East German state enterprises, was murdered by terrorists with connections to the Stasi. In August 1992, the RAF published a

lengthy statement admitting past errors and announcing a decision to suspend the strategy of violence in carrying on its struggle.

By the early 1990s, attention had shifted to violence by neo-Nazi and other right-wing fringe groups. The fanaticism of the xenophobic rightists was fueled by the presence of large numbers of foreign workers and by the increasing number of aliens seeking political asylum in the country. Legal but extreme right-wing parties such as the German People's Union (Deutsche Volksunion—DVP) and the Republikaner (Die Republikaner—REP) maintained their legal status by avoiding Nazi symbols and propaganda and keeping their distance from smaller neo-Nazi groups. With members numbering mostly in the low hundreds, the latter tended to be splintered and indistinct, which helped them evade bans and government surveillance.

Right-wing extremism found new supporters in the wake of the unemployment and turmoil that accompanied German unification. In both the eastern and western parts of Germany, outbreaks of violence were sparked by the growth of racial and ethnic intolerance. The federal police reported 2,285 acts of rightist violence in 1992, a sevenfold increase over the number reported in 1990. Seventeen deaths resulted. The greatest number of perpetrators were youths under the age of twenty. The police count of known right-wing extremists, estimated at some 40,000 in the early 1990s, slightly exceeded the estimated number of left-wing extremists. Some 6,400 of these extreme right-wingers were considered prone to violence. Their attacks were directed against asylum-seekers, migrants from Eastern Europe, nonwhites, and in some cases homosexuals, prostitutes, and members of the former Soviet armed forces. Some of the most serious outrages, such as street assaults and firebombings of hostels for foreigners, occurred in gritty eastern industrial centers—Rostock, Chemnitz, Cottbus, and Leipzig. The west, however, was not immune to such violence, and deaths occurred in bombing incidents in Mölln in late 1992 and in Solingen in mid-1993.

The police were accused of responding slowly when hostel residents were threatened and of treating neo-Nazis too gently, often releasing without charge those allegedly involved in terrorizing hostel-dwellers. Courts handed down mild sentences, in most cases probation or brief jail terms. Western police units had to be deployed to the eastern region to help control the

violence. Under pressure to act more forcefully, the federal police raided premises occupied by the neo-Nazis to gain evidence to suppress them. In December 1992, the federal Ministry of Interior banned four small neo-Nazi groups and also placed the Republikaner under observation to determine whether the organization could be banned as undemocratic under the constitution. A new federal police division to monitor and repress rightist violence was also announced at that time.

These actions soon bore fruit, and in 1993 the number of deaths caused by right-wing violence fell to eight and declined still further in 1994. Tough sentences on right-wing extremists acted as a deterrent to violence, and a tightening of the country's liberal asylum law in May 1993 reduced social tensions about the large number of foreigners living in Germany (see Political Developments since Unification, ch. 7).

International terrorist organizations are represented among several of the colonies of workers and asylum-seekers in Germany. Although more than 2 million Muslims from Turkey, the Middle East, and North Africa live in the cities of western Germany, only a tiny minority can be considered political extremists. In the 1980s, members of the Palestinian groups Hizballah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command had been involved in airline hijackings and attacks on United States service members. During the same decade, members of the Kurdish Workers' Party bombed and staged violent protests at the offices of the Turkish government in Germany, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army carried out several attacks against British military targets in Germany. The number of incidents of international terrorism abated during the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, however, in part because of more determined investigation and prosecution of international terrorism by the German police and judiciary authorities.

* * *

The literature on the German military is vast. Readers seeking an introduction to the subject can consult Gordon A. Craig's classic and widely available *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945*. The same author's *The Battle of Königgrätz* explains why Prussia defeated Austria in 1866. *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gil-

bert, presents several of Germany's military thinkers. Donald Abenheim's *Reforging the Iron Cross,* published in 1988, examines the contradictions between the military traditions of the past and the modern concept of "citizens in uniform."

The information on current staffing levels and equipment of the Bundeswehr reported in this chapter is derived from the 1994–95 edition of *The Military Balance,* an annual produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1994–95.*

Geoffrey Van Orden, a British general who has served in Germany, appraises the changes in sight for the Bundeswehr as it shifts to a new role in "The Bundeswehr in Transition," in the London-based journal *Survival.* Thomas-Durell Young of the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College examines military reforms in *The "Normalization" of the Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures.* The commander of Germany's Eastern Corps, Lieutenant General Werner von Scheven, describes how the Bundeswehr approached one of its most difficult problems in "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies" in the English-language edition of *Aussenpolitik.*

In *German Police,* Erika S. Fairchild discusses law enforcement under the German system, as does Jürgen Thomaneck in his article "Germany" in *Police and Public Order in Europe,* edited by John Roach and Jürgen Thomaneck. The United States Department of State's annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* and its annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism* summarize the threat to internal security and assess police efforts to prevent violence. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	1.8 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Presidents of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–

President	Years in Office	Former Party Affiliation
Theodor Heuss	1949–59	FDP[1]
Heinrich Lübke	1959–69	CDU[2]
Gustav Heinemann	1969–74	SPD[3]
Walter Scheel	1974–79	FDP
Karl Carstens	1979–84	CDU
Richard von Weizsäcker	1984–94	CDU
Roman Herzog	1994–	CDU

[1] Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party).
[2] Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union).
[3] Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany).

Source: Based on information from David Childs, *Germany in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1991, 296.

Table 3. Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–

Date Formed	Reason for Change	Coalition Partners	Chancellor
September 1949 ...	Election	CDU/CSU, FDP, DP[1]	Konrad Adenauer (CDU)
October 1953.....	-do-	CDU/CSU, FDP, DP, All German Bloc/ Federation of Expellees and Displaced Persons	Konrad Adenauer (CDU)
October 1957.....	-do-	CDU/CSU, DP	Konrad Adenauer (CDU)
November 1961....	-do-	CDU/CSU, FDP	Konrad Adenauer (CDU)
October 1963.....	Chancellor retirement	-do-	Ludwig Erhard (CDU)
October 1965.....	Election	-do-	Ludwig Erhard (CDU)
December 1966....	Coalition change	CDU/CSU, SPD[2]	Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU)
October 1969.....	Election	SPD, FDP	Willy Brandt (SPD)
December 1972....	-do-	-do-	Willy Brandt (SPD)
May 1974.....	Chancellor retirement	-do-	Helmut Schmidt (SPD)
December 1976....	Election	-do-	Helmut Schmidt (SPD)
November 1980....	-do-	SPD, FDP	Helmut Schmidt (SPD)
October 1982.....	Constructive no-confidence vote	CDU/CSU, FDP	Helmut Kohl (CDU)
March 1983.....	Election	-do-	Helmut Kohl (CDU)
January 1987.....	-do-	-do-	Helmut Kohl (CDU)
December 1990....	-do-	-do-	Helmut Kohl (CDU)
November 1994....	-do-	-do	Helmut Kohl (CDU)

[1] CDU/CSU—Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)/Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union), FDP—Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party), DP—Deutsche Partei (German Party).
[2] SPD—Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany).

Source: Based on information from Russell J. Dalton, *Politics in Germany*, New York, 1993, 64; and *Keesing's Record of World Events* [Cambridge], 40, No. 11, 1994, 40292.

Table 4. Composition of the Bundestag by Party, 1949–

Year	CDU/CSU[1]	FDP[2]	SPD[3]	Greens	Alliance 90	PDS[4]	Other	Total Seats
1949	139	52	131	—[5]	—	—	80	402
1953	243	48	151	—	—	—	45	487
1957	270	41	169	—	—	—	17	497
1961	242	67	190	—	—	—	0	499
1965	245	49	202	—	—	—	0	496
1969	242	30	224	—	—	—	0	496
1972	225	41	230	—	—	—	0	496
1976	243	39	214	—	—	—	0	496
1980	226	53	218	—	—	—	0	497
1983	244	34	193	27	—	—	0	498
1987	223	46	186	42	—	—	0	497
1990	319	79	239	0	8	17	0	662
1994	294	47	252	49[6]	—[6]	30	0	672

[1] Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)/Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union).
[2] Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party).
[3] Socialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany).
[4] Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism).
[5] — means party did not exist that year.
[6] In 1993 the Alliance 90 and the Greens united to form one party.

Source: Based on information from Russell J. Dalton, *Politics in Germany*, New York, 1993, 286; and *Keesing's Record of World Events* [Cambridge], 40, No. 10, 1994, 40237.

Table 5. German Population, Selected Years, 1850–1990
(in millions)

Year	Population	Year	Population
1850	35.3	1930	65.1
1860	37.6	1940	69.9
1870	40.8	1950	68.4
1880	45.1	1960	72.7
1890	49.2	1970	77.7
1900	56.0	1980	78.3
1910	64.6	1990	79.4
1920	61.8		

Source: Based on information from David Childs, *Germany in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1991, 303; and Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1994, 50.

Table 6. Population of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, Selected Years, 1950–90
(in thousands)

Year	Federal Republic of Germany	German Democratic Republic	Total[1]
1950	49,989	18,388	68,377
1955	52,382	17,944	70,326
1960	55,433	17,241	72,674
1965	58,619	17,028	75,647
1970	60,651	17,058	77,709
1975	61,847	16,850	78,697
1980	61,538	16,737	78,275
1981	61,663	16,736	78,399
1982	61,596	16,697	78,293
1983	61,383	16,699	78,081
1984	61,126	16,671	77,796
1985	60,975	16,644	77,619
1986	61,010	16,624	77,635
1987	61,077	16,641	77,718
1988	61,450	16,666	78,116
1989	62,063	16,614	78,677
1990	63,254	16,111	79,365

[1] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1994, 50.

Table 7. Population, Area, and Capitals of the Länder, *December 31, 1992*

Land	Capital	Area (in square kilometers)	Population	
			Total (in thousands)	Density (persons per square kilometer)
Baden-Württemberg	Stuttgart	35,751	10,149	284
Bavaria	Munich	70,554	11,770	167
Berlin	Berlin	889	3,466	3,898
Brandenburg	Potsdam	29,476	2,543	86
Bremen	Bremen	404	686	1,697
Hamburg	Hamburg	755	1,689	2,236
Hesse	Wiesbaden	21,114	5,923	281
Lower Saxony	Hanover	47,348	7,578	160
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	Schwerin	23,421	1,865	80
North Rhine-Westphalia	Düsseldorf	34,072	17,679	519
Rhineland-Palatinate	Mainz	19,846	3,881	196
Saarland	Saarbrücken	2,570	1,084	422
Saxony	Dresden	18,408	4,641	252
Saxony-Anhalt	Magdeburg	20,443	2,797	137
Schleswig-Holstein	Kiel	15,732	2,680	170
Thuringia	Erfurt	16,176	2,546	157
TOTAL[1]		356,959	80,975	227

[1] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1994, 52.

Table 8. Cities with Population over 250,000, January 1, 1993

City	Population	City	Population
Berlin	3,466,000	Bochum	400,000
Hamburg	1,689,000	Wuppertal	388,000
Munich	1,257,000	Bielefeld	324,000
Cologne	961,000	Mannheim	318,000
Frankfurt am Main	664,000	Halle	300,000
Essen	627,000	Bonn	298,000
Dortmund	601,000	Gelsenkirchen	295,000
Stuttgart	599,000	Chemnitz	284,000
Düsseldorf	578,000	Karlsruhe	279,000
Bremen	554,000	Magdeburg	273,000
Duisburg	539,000	Wiesbaden	268,000
Hanover	524,000	Münster	267,000
Nuremberg	500,000	Mönchengladbach	265,000
Leipzig	497,000	Augsburg	265,000
Dresden	482,000	Braunschweig	258,000

Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., *Der Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995*, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 153.

Table 9. Registered Foreign Residents in Germany by Nationality, Selected Years, 1961–92[1]
(in thousands)

Nationality	1961	1970	1987	1992
European Community[2]				
Greece	42	305	256	346
Italy	197	528	500	558
Portugal	1	48	69	99
Spain	44	239	129	134
Other	107	186	286	370
Total European Community	391	1,306	1,240	1,507
Austria	57	123	150	185
Poland	n.a.[3]	17	121	286
Turkey	7	429	1,454	1,855
United States[4]	15	48	76	104
Yugoslavia	16	410	552	1,018
Other	200	268	648	1,541
TOTAL	686	2,601	4,241	6,496

[1] Prior to 1992, figures are for the former West Germany only.
[2] Figures are for the European Community membership as of 1992: Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
[3] n.a—not available.
[4] Figures do not include United States officials and military personnel based in Germany.

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1994, 72.

Table 10. Principal Causes of Death by Gender, 1991 and 1992 (in thousands)

Cause of Death	1991		1992	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Cardiovascular diseases	190.4	265.4	182.0	255.3
Cancer	105.2	105.3	106.8	105.8
Respiratory diseases	29.7	24.1	28.2	22.2
Injuries and poisonings, including traffic accidents and suicides	28.0	18.7	27.2	17.6
Diseases of digestive tract	22.4	20.6	22.0	20.0
Neurological diseases	12.6	10.8	12.9	11.2
Diabetes	6.3	13.3	6.3	13.2
Diseases of reproductive system and urinary tract	4.5	5.5	4.2	5.3
Other	22.7	25.7	21.0	24.3
TOTAL	421.8	489.4	410.6	474.9

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1994, 458.

Table 11. Overview of Education System, Academic Year 1992–93

Type of Institution	Number of Schools	Number of Teachers	Number of Students
Primary and secondary schools			
Grundschulen	17,941	208,768	3,419,584
Hauptschulen	9,209	101,939	1,483,229
Realschulen	3,634	59,176	1,056,739
Gymnasien	3,126	146,124	2,047,241
Gesamtschulen	930	48,419	493,406
Evening schools	352	3,734	48,606
Total primary and secondary schools	35,192	568,160	8,548,805
Secondary vocational schools			
Berufsschulen	3,233	56,779	1,796,452
Berufsaufbauschulen	230	423	6,564
Berufsfachschulen	2,612	22,103	263,592
Fachoberschulen	740	4,983	75,461
Fachgymnasien	564	9,842	151,819
Total secondary vocational schools	7,379	94,130	2,293,888
Advanced vocational schools			
Fachschulen	1,537	10,953	171,693
Schools of higher education[1]			
Universities	81	127,755[2]	1,223,907
Comprehensive universities	7	8,732	136,731
Teacher-training colleges	8	n.a.[3]	22,518
Theological seminaries	17	n.a.	2,828
Technical colleges	126	5,281[4]	389,501
Art academies	45	1,136	29,718
Colleges of administration	30	n.a.	53,252
Total schools of higher education	314	142,904	1,858,455
TOTAL	44,422	816,147	12,872,841

[1] Figures for numbers of schools and students are for the 1993–94 academic year; figures for number of teachers are for the 1991–92 academic year in the territory of the former West Germany.
[2] Includes teachers at teacher-training colleges and theological seminaries.
[3] n.a.—not available.
[4] Includes teachers at colleges of administration.

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1994, 402–5, 411, 421.

Table 12. Real Changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and in Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 1970–93[1]
(in percentage change from previous year)

Year	GDP	Exports	Imports
1970–77 (average)	2.7	5.7	5.0
1978	3.0	2.9	5.5
1979	4.2	4.3	9.2
1980	1.0	5.2	3.6
1981	0.1	7.2	–3.1
1982	–0.9	3.9	–1.1
1983	1.8	–0.8	1.4
1984	2.8	8.2	5.2
1985	2.0	7.6	4.5
1986	2.3	–0.6	2.7
1987	1.5	0.4	4.2
1988	3.7	5.5	5.1
1989	3.6	10.2	8.3
1990	5.7	11.0	10.3
1991	5.0	10.9	11.6
1992	2.2	0.7	3.8
1993	–1.1	–6.4	–6.3

[1] Figures prior to 1991 are for West Germany only.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Main Economic Indicators* [Paris], March 1995, A4, A12–A13.

Table 13. Distribution of Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Years, 1985–93[1]
(in billions of deutsche marks at current prices)[2]

Sector	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	31.9	37.2	36.3	36.6	33.0
Mining, quarrying, and energy	66.5	70.2			
Manufacturing	578.9	741.0	1,075.1	1,126.9	1,096.6
Construction	94.8	127.5			
Trade, transportation, and communications	261.5	346.6	406.2	416.8	419.8
Government	207.3	253.2	382.0	418.2	439.7
Nonprofit organizations and work done at home	42.7	58.3	916.3	1,029.2	1,118.5
Other services	539.7	791.2			
TOTAL[3]	1,823.2	2,425.2	2,815.9	3,027.6	3,107.5

[1] Figures prior to 1991 are for West Germany only.
[2] For value of the deutsche mark—see Glossary.
[3] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys, 1993–1994: Germany*, Paris, 1994, 150.

Table 14. Agricultural Production, 1993 (in percentages of total production)[1]

Product	Percentage
Animal products	
Milk	25.6
Hogs	15.2
Cattle	13.8
Eggs	3.1
Other[2]	3.4
Total animal products	61.1
Plant products	
Grains	11.2
Fruit	6.3
Sugar beets	4.2
Flowers and decorative plants	4.2
Wine	3.2
Potatoes	1.8
Oilseed	1.1
Other[3]	6.7
Total plant products	38.7
Services	0.2
TOTAL	100.0

[1] Agricultural production amounted to DM64.4 billion (for value of the deutsche mark—see Glossary) in 1993.
[2] Includes poultry, horses, sheep, and wool.
[3] Includes other vegetables, hops, tobacco, and seeds.

Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., *Der Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995*, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 921.

Table 15. Production of Selected Crops, 1991, 1992, and 1993
(in thousands of tons)

Crop	1991	1992	1993
Apples	365	1,378	931
Barley	14,494	12,197	11,006
Beans, broad (dry)	87	56	83
Beans, green	48	59	47
Cabbage	679	714	746
Carrots	225	232	293
Cauliflower	166	150	151
Corn	1,937	2,139	2,657
Cucumbers and gherkins	124	142	118
Currants	126	170	170
Grains, mixed	1,035	1,145	1,405
Grapes	1,373	1,806	1,440
Oats	1,867	1,314	1,731
Onions (dry)	156	201	217
Pears	13	55	43
Plums	13	63	31
Potatoes	10,201	10,897	12,260
Rapeseed	2,972	2,617	2,848
Rye	3,324	2,423	2,984
Strawberries	54	55	59
Sugar beets	25,926	27,150	28,606
Sunflower seed	126	161	210

Source: Based on information from *The Europa World Year Book, 1995*, 1, London, 1995, 1294.

Table 16. Germany's Thirty Largest Industrial Firms, 1993

Firm	Sales (in billions of deutsche marks)[1]	Employees (in thousands)
Daimler-Benz	97.7	366.7
Siemens	81.6	391.0
Volkswagen	76.6	253.0
VEBA	66.3	128.3
RWE	55.8	118.0
Hoechst	46.0	172.5
BASF	43.1	112.0
Bayer	41.0	151.9
Thyssen	33.5	141.0
Bosch	32.5	156.6
BMW	29.0	71.0
Mannesmann	28.0	127.7
Metallgesellschaft	26.1	42.6
VIAG	23.7	80.7
Ruhrkohle	23.4	111.2
Preussag	23.3	73.3
Adam Opel	23.0	50.8
Deutsche Shell	21.4	3.2
Ford	21.2	43.8
Hoesch-Krupp	20.5	78.4
ESSO	19.4	2.4
MAN	19.0	57.8
Bertelsmann	17.2	50.5
Degussa	14.9	32.1
Deutsche BP	14.7	2.8
Ruhrgas	14.3	11.6
Henkel	14.1	40.5
IBM Deutschland	12.6	25.0
Ph. Holzmann	12.5	43.8
Agiv	10.0	42.7

[1] For value of the deutsche mark—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., *Der Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995*, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 997–98.

Table 17. Sources of Electricity, 1993
(in percentages of total production)

Source	Former West Germany[1]	Former East Germany[2]
Nuclear power	33.9	—[3]
Anthracite	31.9	—
Lignite	17.9	91.5
Natural gas	6.6	3.3
Hydroelectric power	4.4	2.3
Petroleum	1.9	1.5
Other	3.4	1.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

[1] Electricity production amounted to 453.2 billion kilowatt-hours in 1993.
[2] Electricity production amounted to 72.9 billion kilowatt-hours in 1993.
[3] — means no production from this source.

Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., *Der Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995*, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 1005-6.

Table 18. Sources of Imported Crude Petroleum by Country, 1993
(in percentages of total imports)[1]

Country	Percentage
Norway	18.4
CIS[2]	17.4
Britain	12.4
Libya	11.6
Saudi Arabia	8.2
Algeria	7.8
Nigeria	7.7
Venezuela	5.4
Syria	5.4
Iran	2.5
Kuwait	1.0
Other[3]	2.2
TOTAL	100.0

[1] Crude petroleum imports amounted to 99.5 million tons in 1993.
[2] Commonwealth of Independent States.
[3] Includes Angola, Yemen, Tunisia, and others.

Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., *Der Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995*, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 972.

Table 19. Major Trading Partners, 1991, 1992, and 1993
(in percentages of total value)

Country	1991	1992	1993
Exports			
France	13.1	13.0	11.7
Italy	9.2	9.3	7.2
Netherlands	8.4	8.3	7.4
Britain	7.6	7.7	7.7
Belgium and Luxembourg	7.3	7.4	6.6
United States	6.3	6.4	7.7
Austria	5.9	5.9	6.2
Switzerland	5.7	5.3	5.6
Spain	4.0	4.1	3.2
Former Soviet Union	2.7	2.1	2.6
Japan	2.5	2.2	2.6
Sweden	2.3	2.2	2.1
Other	25.1	26.2	29.4
Total exports[1]	100.0	100.0	100.0
Imports			
France	12.2	12.0	11.2
Netherlands	9.7	9.6	8.3
Italy	9.3	9.2	8.1
Belgium and Luxembourg	7.1	7.0	5.7
Britain	6.6	6.8	6.0
United States	6.6	6.6	7.4
Japan	6.2	6.0	6.3
Austria	4.2	4.4	4.8
Switzerland	3.9	4.0	4.4
Spain	2.6	2.7	2.6
Former Soviet Union	2.2	2.0	2.4
China	1.8	1.8	2.6
Other	27.5	27.9	30.2
Total imports[1]	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1994, 322.

Table 20. Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1986–93[1]
(in billions of deutsche marks)[2]

	1986	1989	1991	1993
Exports, f.o.b.[3]	526.4	641.0	665.8	603.5
Imports, c.i.f.[4]	–413.7	–506.5	–643.9	–543.7
Supplementary trade items	–1.5	–1.3	2.6	–2.3
Trade balance	111.2	133.3	24.5	57.5
Services (net)	1.7	8.5	1.6	–44.0
Transfer payments (net)	–27.1	–33.7	–59.2	–49.5
Current account balance	85.8	108.1	–33.1	–35.8
Long-term capital	33.4	–22.2	–25.4	198.2
Short-term capital	–116.0	–112.8	43.4	–164.7
Capital account balance	–82.6	–135.1	18.0	34.3
Balance of payments	6.0	189.0	–0.3	35.8
Change in reserves	2.8	–21.6	0.8	–34.2

[1] Figures prior to 1991 are for West Germany only.
[2] For value of the deutsche mark—see Glossary.
[3] f.o.b.—free on board.
[4] c.i.f.—cost, insurance, and freight.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys, 1993–1994: Germany*, Paris, 1994, 155; and Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile, 1993–1994: Germany*, London, 1994, 46.

Table 21. Foreign Trade by Principal Commodity Group, Selected Years, 1985–94[1]
(in billions of deutsche marks)[2]

Commodity Group	1985	1990	1992	1994
Exports, f.o.b.[3]				
Food and live animals	21.5	25.1	29.7	28.7
Beverages and tobacco	3.5	3.7	4.7	5.2
Crude materials (inedible), except fuels	10.7	11.7	12.5	12.4
Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials	15.3	8.2	8.2	7.6
Animal and vegetable oils and fats	2.8	1.5	1.5	1.9
Chemicals	71.1	81.7	84.7	92.2
Manufactured goods, classified chiefly by material	100.3	113.5	111.0	110.0
Machinery and transport equipment	246.7	317.2	333.1	339.3
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	53.6	71.7	75.5	71.8
Commodities and transactions not classified according to kind	11.5	8.4	10.2	21.5
Total exports[4]	537.1	642.8	671.1	690.5
Imports, c.i.f.[5]				
Food and live animals	44.4	46.4	54.7	50.2
Beverages and tobacco	4.6	5.4	6.7	6.3
Crude materials (inedible), except fuels	31.9	29.5	28.5	26.8
Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials	92.2	45.5	47.5	42.9
Animal and vegetable oils and fats	2.8	1.5	1.7	1.8
Chemicals	41.3	49.7	54.6	53.7
Manufactured goods, classified chiefly by material	74.9	98.3	106.2	97.9
Machinery and transport equipment	106.0	178.1	220.5	205.8
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	52.9	83.1	103.3	97.3
Commodities and transactions not classified according to kind	13.0	13.1	13.8	28.4
Total imports[4]	463.8	550.7	637.6	611.1

[1] Prior to 1991, figures are for West Germany only.
[2] For value of the deutsche mark—see Glossary.
[3] f.o.b.—free on board.
[4] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
[5] c.i.f.—cost, insurance, and freight.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys, 1994–1995: Germany*, Paris, 1995, 173.

Table 22. Land *Legislative Elections, 1992–95*

Land	Election Date	CDU[1]	SPD[2]	FDP[3]	Greens[4]	PDS[5]	Other	Total Number of Deputies
Baden-Württemberg	April 1992	64	46	8	13	—[6]	15	146
Bavaria[7]	September 1994	120	70	—	14	—	—	204
Berlin	December 1990	101	76	18	19	22	5	241
Brandenburg	November 1994	18	52	—	—	18	—	88
Bremen	May 1995	37	37	—	14	—	12	100
Hamburg	September 1993	36	58	—	19	—	8	121
Hesse	February 1995	45	44	8	13	—	—	110
Lower Saxony	March 1994	67	81	—	13	—	—	161
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	October 1994	30	23	—	—	18	—	71
North Rhine-Westphalia	May 1995	89	108	—	24	—	—	221
Rhineland-Palatinate	April 1991	40	47	7	7	—	—	101
Saarland	October 1994	21	27	—	3	—	—	51
Saxony	September 1994	77	22	—	—	21	—	120

Table 22. (Continued) Land *Legislative Elections, 1992–95*

Land	Election Date	CDU[1]	SPD[2]	FDP[3]	Greens[4]	PDS[5]	Other	Total Number of Deputies
Saxony-Anhalt	June 1994	37	36	—	5	21	—	99
Schleswig-Holstein	April 1992	32	45	5	—	—	7	89
Thuringia	October 1994	42	29	—	—	17	—	88

[1] Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union).
[2] Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany).
[3] Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party).
[4] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens).
[5] Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism).
[6] — means no seats won.
[7] In Bavaria the CDU is represented by the Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union—CSU).

Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed. *Der Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995*, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 25–26, 157–82; *Keesing's Record of World Events* [Cambridge], 41, No. 2, 1995, 40424; and *Keesing's Record of World Events* [Cambridge], 41, No. 4, 1995, 40561.

Table 23. Major Army Equipment, 1994

Type and Description	Country of Origin	Number in Inventory
Main battle tanks		
Leopard-1/2	Germany	2,855
Armored vehicles		
Reconnaissance		
Various models	-do-	514
Infantry fighting vehicles		
Marder A3	-do-	2,443
Armored personnel carriers		
M-113	United States	2,900
Various models	Germany	900
Artillery		
105mm to 155mm, towed	Various	378
155mm, self-propelled	-do-	577
Multiple rocket launchers		
110mm to 227mm	-do-	228
Antitank guided missiles		
Milan	France/Germany	1,964
TOW	United States	233
HOT	France/Germany	316
Surface-to-air missile launchers		
Roland, self-propelled	-do-	142
Attack helicopters		
PAH-1 with HOT missiles	-do-	205

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1994–1995*, London, 1994, 50.

Table 24. Major Naval Equipment, 1994[1]

Type and Description	Number in Service	Year Commissioned
Submarines		
Type 205	2	1964–66
Type 206/206A	18	1973–75
Destroyers		
Adams class	3	1969–70
Hamburg class, Type 101A	1	1964–65
Frigates		
Bremen class	8	1982–90
Brandenburg class	1	1994
Fast-attack craft (missile)		
Gepard class	10	1982–84
Albatross class	10	1976–77
Tiger class	18	1972–75
Minesweepers and minehunters		
Various types	45	Various dates
Naval aircraft		
Tornado fighter/ground attack	64	-do-
Atlantic marine reconnaissance and electronic intelligence	18	-do-
Do–28 search and air rescue	2	-do
Helicopters		
Sea Lynx antisubmarine	17	-do-
Sea King search and air rescue	22	-do-
Mi–8 transport	29	-do

[1] Main fleet units were constructed in West Germany except Adams-class destroyers, which were built in the United States and reconditioned in West Germany.

Source: Based on information from *The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 1995*, Annapolis, 1995, 212–23; and *The Military Balance, 1994–1995*, London, 1994, 50–51.

Table 25. Major Air Force Equipment, 1994

Type and Description	Country of Origin	Number in Inventory
Air defense and fighter-ground attack aircraft		
F–4F	United States	150
Tornado	Germany (consortium)	193
MiG–29	Soviet Union	20
Alpha Jet	France/Germany	34
Reconnaissance and electronic intelligence		
RF–4E	United States	7
Tornado	Germany (consortium)	35
Transport		
Transall C–160	Germany/France	85
Helicopters		
UH–1D	-do-	108
Air defense missiles		
Hawk launchers	United States	216
Roland launchers	France/Germany	95
Patriot launchers	United States/Germany	288

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1994–1995*, London, 1994, 51–52.

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Glossary

alb—A flat or gently inclined shelf high in a glaciated mountain valley.

Bretton Woods system—The global financial and monetary system established in 1944 at the New Hampshire resort of Bretton Woods. It created the World Bank (*q.v.*) and the International Monetary Fund (*q.v.*), as well as a fixed link between the United States dollar and gold at US$35 per troy ounce. The system collapsed in 1971, when the link between the dollar and gold was broken, but the institutions survive.

Bundesbank—The German central bank, with headquarters in Frankfurt am Main, was established in 1957.

Central Bank Council—The seventeen-member decision-making body of the Bundesbank (*q.v.*). The council includes the presidents of the *Land* central banks (*q.v.*) and the members of the Directorate (*q.v.*). The council meets every second Thursday.

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—First established in 1962, the CAP aims at ensuring the free trade of farm products within the European Union (EU—*q.v.*), guaranteeing the prices of these products, and maintaining protective tariffs against farm products from outside the EU.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—Created on December 8, 1991, with the signing of the Minsk Agreement by Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. The Alma-Ata Declaration, signed by eleven heads of state on December 21, 1991, expanded membership in the CIS to all other former Soviet republics except Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Moldova joined the CIS in April 1994. The CIS is a confederation of former Soviet republics in which "coordinating bodies" oversee common interests in the economy, foreign policy, and defense of its members.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—*See* Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty)—An agreement signed in 1990 by the member nations of the Warsaw Pact (*q.v.*) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—*q.v.*) to establish parity in conventional

weapons between the two organizations from the Atlantic to the Urals. The treaty included a strict system of inspection and information exchange and remained in force, although not strictly observed by all parties, in the mid-1990s.

deutsche mark (DM)—The national currency unit, consisting of 100 pfennigs. The value of the deutsche mark has fluctuated with international monetary developments—generally upward since its introduction in the currency reform of 1948. The number of deutsche marks per US$1 averaged 4.20 in 1950, 4.20 in 1960, 4.00 in 1965, 3.65 in 1970, 2.62 in 1975, 1.96 in 1980, 2.94 in 1985, 1.62 in 1990, 1.56 in 1992, 1.65 in 1993, 1.64 in 1994, and 1.43 in 1995.

Directorate—The eight-member executive board of the Bundesbank (*q.v.*). Its members sit on the Central Bank Council (*q.v.*).

discount rate—Interest rate at which the Bundesbank (*q.v.*) lends to banks by rediscounting trade bills and treasury bills falling due within three months.

European Commission—A governing body of the European Union (EU—*q.v.*) that oversees the organization's treaties, recommends actions under the treaties, and issues independent decisions on EU matters.

European Community (EC)—A grouping of three primarily economic organizations: the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom or EAEC), and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Founded separately in 1952 and 1957, the three came to be known collectively as the EC. Executive power rests with the European Commission (*q.v.*). Members in 1993 were Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. In November 1993, the EC was subsumed under a new organization, the European Union (EU—*q.v.*).

European Council—A body formed when the heads of state or government of European Union (EU—*q.v.*) member states meet. Held at least twice a year, these meetings determine the major guidelines for the EU's future development.

European currency unit (ECU)—Established in 1979 as a composite of the monetary systems of European Community (EC—*q.v.*) member nations, the ECU functions in the

European Monetary System (EMS—*q.v.*) and serves as the unit for exchange-rate establishment, credit and intervention operations, and settlements between monetary authorities of member nations.

European Economic Area (EEA)—An economic area encompassing all the members of the European Union (EU—*q.v.*) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA—*q.v.*), with the exception of Switzerland. Established in 1993, the EEA went into effect on January 1, 1994. The EEA is a single market for the free movement of labor, services, capital (with some restrictions on investments), and most products. EFTA members have agreed to accept EU regulations in many areas, including company law, education, environmental protection, mergers, and social policy.

European Economic Community (EEC)—*See* European Community (EC).

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—Founded in 1960, EFTA aims at supporting free trade among its members and increasing the liberalization of trade on a global basis, particularly within Western Europe. In 1995 the organization's member states were Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.

European Monetary System (EMS)—Established in 1979 by the European Economic Community (EEC—*q.v.*), the EMS was created to stabilize currency values because the Bretton Woods system (*q.v.*) proved not fully satisfactory. All European Union (EU—*q.v.*) countries are EMS members. The EMS is to be succeeded by the European Monetary Union (EMU—*q.v.*).

European Monetary Union (EMU)—The EMU is a plan for a single European central bank and for a single European currency to replace national banks and currencies for those European states that qualify. The EMU is the planned follow-on of the European Monetary System (EMS—*q.v.*).

European Union (EU)—Successor organization to the European Community (EC—*q.v.*), officially established on November 1, 1993, when the Treaty on European Union (*q.v.*) went into effect. The goal of the EU is a closer economic union of it member states, including the European Monetary Union (EMU—*q.v*), a greater unity in matters of justice and domestic affairs, and the development of a common foreign and security policy. To the members of

the EC, the EU added Austria, Finland, and Sweden, effective January 1, 1995.

exchange-rate mechanism (ERM)—A mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS—*q.v.*), the ERM is designed to establish fixed exchange rates among EMS currencies. Not all European Union (EU—*q.v.*) states are members.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—The global trading system, based on the Havana Treaty of 1947, that obligates states to follow the "most favored nation" principle to avoid discriminatory trade practices. GATT was succeeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1996.

gross domestic product (GDP)—The total value of goods and services produced exclusively within a nation's domestic economy, in contrast to the gross national product (GNP—*q.v.*). Usually computed over a one-year period.

gross national product (GNP)—The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders and the income received from abroad by residents, minus payments remitted abroad by nonresidents. Usually computed over a one-year period.

Group of Seven (G–7)—The seven-nation organization was established in 1973, with an annual summit beginning in 1975, to attempt to coordinate its members' economic policies. Members are Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients.

Land central bank—The central bank of a German state (*Land*; pl., *Länder*) or group of *Länder*. The presidents of the nine *Land* central banks sit on the Central Bank Council (*q.v.*) of the Bundesbank (*q.v.*).

Lombard rate—The interest rate at which the Bundesbank (*q.v.*) extends credit to commercial banks in order to cover temporary financing gaps. It is usually somewhat higher than the Bundesbank's discount rate (*q.v.*).

Maastricht Treaty—*See* Treaty on European Union.

nomenklatura—The communist party's system of appointing key personnel in the government and other important organizations, based on lists of critical positions and people in political favor. Also refers to the individuals included on these lists.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—Frequently called, particularly in official NATO publications, the Atlantic Alliance or the Alliance. Created as a defensive political and military alliance by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, with twelve charter members: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. Greece and Turkey became members in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—Established in 1961 to replace the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the OECD is an international organization composed of the industrialized market economy countries, as well as some developing countries, by providing a forum in which to establish and coordinate policies.

Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)—*See* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—The Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe (CSCE) was established as an international process in 1972. The group, consisting of fifty-three nations in 1995, included all the European countries and sponsored joint sessions and consultations on political issues vital to European security. The Charter of Paris (1990) changed the CSCE from an ad hoc forum to an organization having permanent institutions. In 1992 new CSCE roles in conflict prevention and management were defined, potentially making the CSCE the center of a Europe-based collective security system. In the early 1990s, however, applications of these instruments to conflicts in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus did not have a decisive impact. In January 1995, the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Treaty on European Union—The agreement that established

the European Union (EU—*q.v.*) in November 1993. It is usually referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, the small Dutch town where it was negotiated by the twelve European Community (EC—*q.v.*) members in December 1991.

Uruguay Round—The trade negotiating round, under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—*q.v.*), concluded at the end of 1993. It pitted the United States against France and some other European Union (EU—*q.v.*) states over EU agricultural subsidies, with Germany in the middle. A compromise was reached, including agreement for establishing a World Trade Organization (WTO). On January 1, 1996, GATT was succeeded by the WTO.

value-added tax (VAT)—A tax applied to the additional value created at a given stage of production and calculated as a percentage of the difference between the product value at that stage and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs. The VAT is the primary form of indirect taxation applied in the European Union (EU—*q.v.*), and it is the basis of each country's contribution to the community budget.

Warsaw Pact—Informal name for the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a mutual defense organization founded in 1955, which included the Soviet Union, Albania (which withdrew in 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The Warsaw Pact enabled the Soviet Union to station troops in the countries to its west to oppose the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—*q.v.*). The pact was the basis of the invasion of Hungary (1956) and of Czechoslovakia (1968); it was disbanded in July 1991.

Western European Union (WEU)—Founded in 1948 to facilitate West European cooperation in economic, social, cultural, and defense matters. Reactivated in 1984 to concentrate on the defense and disarmament concerns of its members, the WEU is headed by a council consisting of its members' ministers of foreign affairs and defense. The council meets twice a year; lower-level WEU entities meet with greater frequency. In 1995 WEU members were Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden were observers;

Iceland, Norway, and Turkey were associate members; and a number of East European states were associate partners.

World Bank—Informal name for a group of four affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital for credit and investment in developing countries; each institution has a specialized agenda for aiding economic growth in target countries.

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